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Section 1: Introduction 
 A visibly agitated President Barack Obama stood before the White House press 
corps and prepared to issue his statement.  It was July 22, 2011 and the August second 
deadline to raise the debt ceiling, the statutory limit to the federal debt, was rapidly 
approaching.  For weeks, the President and Congressional leaders had negotiated in the 
hopes of reaching a deal that would raise the debt ceiling while simultaneously taking 
serious steps to reduce the national debt.  According to sources, President Obama and the 
Republican Speaker of the House, John Boehner, had recently made progress on a 
package that would achieve $4 trillion in deficit reduction through a combination of 
spending cuts and increased revenues from closing tax loopholes, a so-called “grand 
bargain”.1  Heightened partisan tensions and divided government made such a deal 
unlikely, but the President had appeared optimistic.
2
   
 However, Obama’s statement made it abundantly clear that the grand bargain 
would not take place.  According to Obama, Boehner had backed out of the deal and 
abandoned the negotiations.  “I’ve been left at the altar now a couple of times,” the 
disgruntled president told the audience.
3
  A defiant Boehner fired back at his own press 
conference, telling reporters that he was not to be blamed for the collapse of the 
negotiations.  Instead, President Obama was at fault for attempting to include tax 
increases at the last possible moment, a condition Boehner and the Republican 
                                                             
1
 Joseph J. Shatz and Paul M. Krawzak, "Debt Plans Remain in Limbo," CQ Weekly (July 18, 2011): 1554-
56, http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport112-000003909590 (accessed April 
12, 2012). 
2
 Paul M. Krawzak and Sam Goldfarb, "Debt Talks Move Into High Gear," CQ Weekly (July 11, 2011): 
1494-95, http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport112-000003904277 (accessed 
September 2, 2011). 
3
 “Obama: I Have Been Left at the Altar,” uploaded to YouTube on July 22, 2011by tpmtv, Talking Points 
Memo, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q8MvUiK7n90 (accessed February 18, 2012).  
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Congressional delegation deemed unacceptable. “The White House moved the 
goalposts,” Boehner told the press.4  Overall, it was not entirely clear who was to blame 
for the breakdown of negotiations.  Nevertheless, it was evident that if an agreement was 
not reached soon, the United States would default for the first time in the nation’s history.   
 For most members of Congress, the crux of the issue was not whether to increase 
the debt ceiling, or even whether the debt ceiling increase should include a deficit 
reduction package.  In fact, on May 31, the House of Representatives voted down a 
resolution to increase the debt ceiling without any deficit reduction measures.
5
  Thus, it 
was clear most members agreed that any successful debt ceiling legislation would need to 
include a deficit reduction package.  At its core, the standoff stemmed from two 
contrasting perspectives on the best manner through which to achieve deficit reduction.  
President Obama and the Democratically-controlled Senate advocated a “balanced” 
approach, coupling spending cuts with increased taxes on the upper class and large 
corporations.
6
  In contrast, Congressional Republicans, with a majority in the House of 
Representatives, pushed for deeper spending cuts and refused to accept a deal that 
included any new taxes.
7
  
 However, the negotiations were further complicated by members of the Tea Party, 
a faction of radical Republicans with a strong presence in the House of Representatives.  
                                                             
4
 “Boehner: Obama ‘Moved the Goal Posts’ on Debt-Ceiling Deal,” uploaded to YouTube on July 22, 2011 
by PBSNewsHour, PBS, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKWJ67S7HEI (accessed February 18, 2012).  
5
 “Debt Ceiling: Timeline of Deal’s Development,” CNNPolitics.com, August 2, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/07/25/debt.talks.timeline/index.html (accessed October 10, 2011). 
6
 Barack Obama, “Address by the President to the Nation,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, July 
25, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/address-president-nation (accessed April 
11, 2012). 
7
 CNN.com Staff, “Transcript of Boehner’s Speech: Washington’s Spending Binge is Over,” CNN.com, 
July 25, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-25/politics/boehner.speech.transcript_1_debt-limit-national-
debt-fiscal-trajectory?_s=PM:POLITICS (accessed April 11, 2012).  
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Of the 242 Republicans in the House, 60 identified as Tea Party members,
8
 meaning that 
any debt ceiling increase was contingent upon Tea Party support.  However, some Tea 
Party members refused to compromise with Congressional Democrats.  Others refused to 
raise the debt ceiling under any circumstances.  Michelle Bachmann, a prominent Tea 
Party member who also mounted a run for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, 
articulated this viewpoint, referring to the idea that the debt ceiling must be increased as a 
“flawed assumption.”9  Many Tea Party members concurred with Bachmann and stressed 
that the consequences of default would not be as bad as economists believed.   
 With the two sides deadlocked, the standoff captivated public attention and 
dominated media coverage.  For the three weeks prior to the August second deadline, the 
debt ceiling was the top concern of the public and the most popular issue covered by the 
media, according to data supplied by the Pew Research Center.
10
  The debt ceiling also 
entered popular culture, as evidenced by a popular YouTube video featuring comedic 
rapper Remy.  In the video, Remy repeatedly begs Congress to raise the debt ceiling, 
while also commenting on the dire state of the nation’s fiscal policies.11  In sum, there 
seemed to be a very real possibility that the United States could actually default on its 
debt for the first time in the nation’s history.   
Thesis 
                                                             
8
 Shannon Travis, “Who is the Tea Party Caucus?,” CNN.com, July 29, 2011, 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/29/who-is-the-tea-party-caucus-in-the-house/ (accessed April 
3, 2012). 
9
 Fred Barbash and Christina Bellantoni, "Read Her Lips," CQ Weekly (August 1, 2011): 1687, 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport112-000003920653 (accessed April 10, 
2012). 
10
 “Attention to Debt Debate Grew Steadily in July,” Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 
August 2, 2011, http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/02/attention-to-debt-debate-grew-steadily-in-july/ 
(accessed February 18, 2012).  
11
 “Remy: Raise the Debt Ceiling Rap,” uploaded to YouTube on July 25, 2011 by ReasonTV, Reason TV, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EoS52fVtVQM (accessed February 18, 2012). 
D’Alessio 4 
 
 Throughout the debt ceiling impasse of 2011, many analysts and politicians stated 
that the United States had never before struggled to raise the debt ceiling.  President 
Obama even said as much, declaring in his July 25 address to the nation that “In the past, 
raising the debt ceiling was routine.”12  However, an examination of debt ceiling votes 
from 1950-present reveals gross inaccuracies in President Obama’s statement.  Since 
1950, controversy and dispute have characterized debt ceiling votes.  In some cases, these 
disputes have developed into full-fledged crises in which default seemed a real 
possibility.  Thus, the events of the summer of 2011 were not an anomaly.  Rather, what 
took place in 2011 was the latest manifestation of a recurring event in United States 
politics.   
 In the remaining two sections of this paper, I will shed more light on debt ceiling 
crises by answering the following question: Why have periodic debt ceiling crises 
occurred since the 1950s?  To answer this question, it is important to remember that the 
debt ceiling is part of the larger battle over fiscal policy, particularly budgeting and 
borrowing, and is therefore subject to many of the same factors that impact individual 
behavior on these issues.  Therefore, I conclude that debt ceiling crises are the product of 
two structural issues that have shaped United States politics in the post-1950 era: 
increases in the size of the national debt and divided government.  Given the influence of 
these factors, it is possible to draw a number of hypotheses which we will now examine.   
Increases in the National Debt  
                                                             
12
 Barack Obama, “Address by the President to the Nation,” July 25, 2011.  
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 From the nation’s founding until the middle of the twentieth century, Congress 
maintained strict controls over fiscal policy and accordingly, balanced budgets and 
limited national debt became the nation’s fiscal norms.  However, beginning in the 
middle of the twentieth century, deficit spending became more common as the 
government increased spending on social programs, such as Social Security and 
Medicare, as well as military expenditures stemming from the Cold War.
13
  As the debt 
has grown, members have demonstrated increasing concern,
14
 resulting in attempts to use 
the debt ceiling to curtail borrowing.  Most significantly, since the 1980s members have 
attempted to attach deficit reduction plans to debt ceiling legislation.
15
  This tactic has 
greatly complicated debt ceiling negotiations because members must agree not only on 
the size of the debt ceiling increase, but also on the conditions of the attached deficit 
reduction package.  Additionally, they must do so under the rapidly approaching 
possibility of default.  This has amounted to a daunting task and precipitated a number of 
crises.  Thus, I conclude that higher levels of debt will create more frequent instances of 
debt ceiling crisis. 
Divided Government and Party Polarization 
 Debt ceiling votes traditionally split along partisan lines.  This is not a problem 
under unified government because the president’s party can secure the necessary increase 
through sheer numerical advantages.   However, the partisan nature of debt ceiling votes 
has significant implications under divided government.  The debt ceiling is a unique vote 
                                                             
13
 Lance T. LeLoup, Parties, Rules, and the Evolution of Congressional Budgeting (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2005): 29-30.  
14
 James D. Savage, Balanced Budgets and American Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988): 1-8. 
15
 Linda K. Kowalcky and Lance T. LeLoup. “Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt Limitation,” 
Public Administration Review Vol. 53, No.1 (Jan.-Feb., 1993): 14. 
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because it holds what Kowalcky and LeLoup call “must-pass” value.16  That is, because 
the consequences of default are so dire, failing to raise the debt ceiling is typically not 
viewed as a viable outcome.  The minority party often attempts to exploit this “must-
pass” quality to score political points against the majority party and dictate the terms of 
the debt ceiling increase.  Ultimately, this creates a game of political chicken in which 
each party holds their course for as long as possible before reaching a deal just prior to 
default.   
 Significantly, divided government has characterized the partisan composition of 
the federal government in the post-1950 era.  Of the 26 presidential and midterm 
elections between 1900 and 1952, only four (15.4%) resulted in divided government.  
Conversely, in the twenty-nine presidential and midterm elections from 1952-present, 
eighteen (62%) left the government divided.
17
  Furthermore, increased partisanship in this 
era has exacerbated the impact of divided government.  Individual members and parties 
are more ideologically polarized today than in the past and members demonstrate better 
party teamwork when voting.  In an era in which compromise has become anathema and 
divided government increasingly common, it is not surprising that debt ceiling legislation 
would often result in crisis.  Thus, I conclude that there is greater likelihood of debt 
ceiling crisis during divided government, especially given the increased levels of 
partisanship and party polarization in recent years.     
 Finally, we will examine three debt ceiling crises in further detail: 1985, 1995-
1996, and 2011.  Notably, all three cases involved disputes over attaching deficit 
                                                             
16
 Kowalcky and LeLoup, 15. 
17
 Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992): 6-7. With 
data added for elections from 1994-Present. 
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reduction plans to a debt ceiling increase and took place during divided government.  In 
1985, Congress utilized the need for a debt ceiling increase to force the passage of the 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known as Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, after its Congressional sponsors, or simply Gramm-Rudman.  The 1995-1996 
crisis bears significance as the Republican Congressional leadership attempted 
unsuccessfully to force Democratic President Bill Clinton to accept numerous provisions 
of the Contract with America in return for raising the debt ceiling.  Finally, I return with a 
more in-depth discussion of the 2011 debt ceiling incident.    
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Section 2: Causes of Debt Ceiling Conflict 
The Debt Ceiling and Crises 
 In 1917, Congress created the debt ceiling through the passage of the Second 
Liberty Loan Act.  Although the debt ceiling has undergone some changes throughout its 
history, its basic purpose has remained the same.  In simplest terms, the debt ceiling 
functions as a statutory cap on the total amount of debt the federal government can incur.  
Congress establishes the limit and the Treasury Department then determines how to 
manage the debt in order to remain below the limit.  If the Treasury Department believes 
they cannot meet the nation’s borrowing needs based on the limit, they request that 
Congress raise the limit.
18
   
 If Congress fails to raise the limit in order to accommodate borrowing, then the 
United States defaults on its debt.  Thus far, Congress has always complied with the 
Treasury’s request to raise the debt ceiling prior to default and therefore we cannot be 
entirely sure what the consequences of default would be.
19
  However, economists 
overwhelmingly agree that default would devastate both the domestic and international 
economies.
20
  First and foremost, default would mean the government could not pay the 
salaries of any government workers, including both civilian and military employees,
21
 or 
make any payments in programs such as Medicare and Social Security.  Additionally, 
                                                             
18
 Kowalcky and LeLoup, 14-15. 
19
 Mindy R. Levit, et al, “Reaching the Debt Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government 
Operations,” Congressional Research Service, (July 27, 2011): 10. 
20
 Senate Finance Committee, Debt Limit, 104
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., July 28, 1995, 15, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING-ID=HRG-1995-FNS-0028 (accessed April 12, 
2012).  
21
 Senate Finance Committee, Debt Limit Extension—1986, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15, 1986, 6, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING-ID=HRG-1986-FNS-0023 (accessed April 12, 
2012). 
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default, or even the simple threat of default, would likely damage investor confidence, 
potentially increasing interest rates, or leading to a downgrade of the nation’s credit 
rating.  Because United States debt is so widely dispersed around the world, the negative 
consequences would affect global markets as well.
22
  Thus, some economists have even 
suggested that default could potentially cause a worldwide recession or even 
depression.
23
   
 The most significant change to the debt ceiling was the passage of the Gephardt 
Rule in 1979, first implemented in 1980.  Named for its creator, Congressman Richard 
Gephardt (D-MO), the Gephardt Rule protects House members from taking an excessive 
number of votes on the debt ceiling.  The rule states that if the annual budget resolution 
passes the House, the House is also deemed to have passed a joint resolution raising the 
debt ceiling by the amount required to cover the budgetary expenses.  The resolution is 
then sent to the Senate.  If the Senate does not add any amendments to the joint 
resolution, the House does not need to take a separate vote raising the debt ceiling.  
However, if the Senate attaches any amendments, the House must hold a separate vote on 
the amended legislation.  Overall, Congress has had a highly ambivalent relationship with 
the Gephardt Rule and has only utilized it in 19 years since 1980.
24
    
  In certain instances since 1950, Congress has experienced such difficulty raising 
the debt ceiling that default appeared a distinct possibility.  When this occurs, we say that 
a debt ceiling crisis has taken place.  There are three chief indicators that signify that a 
                                                             
22
 Anita S. Krishnakumar, “In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute,” Legal Studies Research Paper Series, St. 
John’s University School of Law, Paper #00-71 (April 2007): 175. 
23
 Mark Zandi. “U.S. Economy Hangs on a Debt-Ceiling Deal,” Moody’s Analytics, July31, 2011, 
http://www.economy.com/dismal/article_free.asp?cid=223659&src=msnbc (accessed November 25, 2011). 
24
 Bill Heniff, Jr, “Developing Debt-Limit Legislation: The House’s ‘Gephardt Rule,’” Congressional 
Research Service (March 18, 2010): 7. 
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debt ceiling crisis has taken place.  First, Congress may pass a series of short-term debt 
ceiling increases, rather than the preferable lengthier increase.  Second, the Treasury 
Department often utilizes extraordinary measures or “accounting tricks” to avoid 
default.
25
  Usually, these actions take place without Congressional approval, which has 
created some questions as to their legality.
26
  The most common tactic has been the delay 
or postponement of debt auctions,
27
 but in 1985 at the height of the Gramm-Rudman 
crisis, Treasury was forced to divest funds from the Social Security trust fund, a truly 
drastic action.
28
  Lastly, debt ceiling crises often involve the outright defeat of debt 
ceiling legislation, which necessitates further negotiations.   
The Impact of Increasing National Debt on Debt Ceiling Crises 
Introduction 
 Increases in the size of the national debt have directly contributed to debt ceiling 
crises.  In order to understand why this is the case, we must first conduct a brief survey of 
US fiscal history.  Scholars examining US fiscal history typically note the presence of 
three distinct periods: 1789-1917, 1917-1950, and 1950-present.
29
  These divisions 
underscore the tremendous degree of change that has taken place in fiscal policy 
throughout the US history.  Until the early twentieth century, the federal government 
pursued conservative fiscal policies marked by balanced budgets and concerted attempts 
to pay down the national debt.  However, beginning in the early twentieth century, fiscal 
                                                             
25
 Krishnakumar, 176. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Kowalcky and LeLoup, 22. 
28
 Howard E. Shuman, Politics and the Budget: The Struggle Between the President and the Congress, 3
rd
 
ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1992): 285. 
29
 Krishnakumar, 140 and Kowalcky and LeLoup. 
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norms began to change and deficit spending and debt accumulation became the new 
fiscal norms.   
A Survey of United States Fiscal Policy 
1789-1917 
 Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution explicitly delegates to 
Congress the power to regulate fiscal policy, including authority over federal borrowing.  
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Congress specifically approved 
every single instance of debt, including the interest rate and term.
30
  Borrowing was a 
cumbersome and time-consuming process, one that could not be undertaken for trivial 
reasons.  When borrowing did occur, it was typically during war or economic recession.  
For instance, in order to finance the Spanish-American War, Congress passed the 1898 
War Revenue Act.  This legislation approved $500 million in debt, of which $100 million 
would have a maturity of within one year, and $400 million would be allowed to have 
longer maturities.
31
  Further, once the war or recession passed, the federal government 
made a point of repaying the debt as quickly as possible through tariffs and taxes.
32
  This 
period of fiscal conservatism culminated in 1835, when Democratic President Andrew 
Jackson reduced the national debt to a mere $37,513.
33
   
1917-1950  
                                                             
30
 Krishnakumar, 143-144. 
31
 D. Andrew Austin and Mindy R. Levit, “The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases,” Congressional 
Research Service (April 5, 2011):  4. 
32
 Krishnakumar, 143. 
33
 Gail E. Makinen, “Is the National Debt a Burden on Future Generations?” Congressional Research 
Service (May 6, 1986). 
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 United States entry into World War I necessitated unprecedented levels of 
borrowing.  As a result, Congress created the debt ceiling through the Second Liberty 
Loan Act.  In doing so, Congress intended to grant the Treasury Department sufficient 
authority to conduct wartime borrowing, while still allowing Congress to manage the 
debt and prevent it from increasing excessively.
34
  Initially, it appeared the debt ceiling 
would function as an effective check on executive borrowing.  Between 1921 and 1931, 
the debt limit remained constant at $43.5 billion,
35
 and the federal government ran a 
surplus from 1920-1930.
36
   
 However, the Great Depression of the 1930s and the outbreak of World War II in 
the 1940s required a return to deficit spending.  Economic crisis and war had traditionally 
been acceptable justifications for borrowing, but the fact that both events occurred in 
quick succession meant that borrowing reached unprecedented levels.  Beginning in 
1931, the federal government ran a deficit for sixteen consecutive years
37
 and at the 
height of the war effort in 1945, the debt to GDP ratio climbed to over 100% of GDP for 
the first time in the nation’s history.38  In 1946, this ratio peaked at 122%, the greatest 
ratio in the entire history of the United States.
39
 
1950-Present 
 In the middle of the twentieth century, the United States began to deviate from its 
traditional fiscal conservatism.  President John F. Kennedy’s election in 1960 marked the 
                                                             
34
 Austin and Levit, 4. 
35
 Kowalcky and LeLoup, 15. 
36
 Table 3. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Table 4. 
39
 Ibid. 
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ascent of Keynesian economics, with its emphasis on deficit spending, as the preeminent 
school of economic thought.
40
  Kennedy was the first president to explicitly articulate 
deficit spending as an economic policy, but Keynesian policies continued throughout the 
1970s, even under Republican presidents.
41
  In fact, Republican President Richard Nixon 
once famously described his economic policy by noting that, “I am now a Keynesian.”42  
Deficit spending stemmed primarily from military expenditures during the Cold War, 
particularly the Vietnam War, and increases in the size of the American welfare state 
through programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.  The federal government ran a surplus 
in 1969, but would not do so again until 1998 during the Clinton administration, 
illustrating the tremendous extent to which deficit spending became the fiscal norm.
43
   
 From 1980-present, the pace of borrowing has accelerated.  The Reagan 
administration made concerted efforts to bring deficits under control, but was 
unsuccessful.  In 1983, the deficit accounted for 6% of GDP, the greatest percentage 
since World War II.
44
  Additionally, the 1986 deficit of $221.2 billion was the highest 
ever in the history of the United States, although this number would soon be eclipsed.
45
  
Between 1981 and 1986, the national debt more than doubled, moving from $994.8 
billion to $2120.5 billion.  The Clinton administration enjoyed a brief period of surplus 
from 1998-2001, but this proved an aberration, rather than a return to balanced budgeting.  
In the 2000s, the Bush tax cuts, along with the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars and financial 
services industry bailout, coupled with President Barack Obama’s economic stimulus 
                                                             
40
 Kowalcky and LeLoup, 17. 
41
 Douglas R. Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990): 159. 
42
 Justin Fox, “The Comeback Keynes,”Time.com, October 23, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1853302,00.html (accessed April 1, 2012). 
43
 Table 3. 
44
 Table 2. 
45
 Table 3. 
D’Alessio 14 
 
package, quickly erased the surplus and created the largest deficits and most rapid debt 
accumulation in the history of the United States.  In 2009, deficit spending peaked 
at10.1% of GDP.  By 2011, the national debt stood at 99% of GDP and over $14 
trillion.
46
   
Member Concerns with Increasing Debt 
 As the debt has increased, members have demonstrated concern with the nation’s 
fiscal course for political, economic, and symbolic reasons.  From a political standpoint, 
members recognize that the Constitution grants Congress the explicit responsibility for 
managing federal borrowing and by extension, managing the nation’s fiscal policy.  Thus, 
the deficits and debt accumulation that have characterized US fiscal history since 1950 
are often attributed to a failure of Congressional responsibility and unwillingness to 
restrain spending.  Donald F. Kettl writes that, “Lingering behind these [fiscal] problems 
is a clear sense among many observers that the answer to the budget dilemma are right 
under our noses—but that elected officials do not have the guts to make them.”47  Even 
members of Congress have articulated this sentiment.  In December 2011, on the heels of 
the summer 2011 debt ceiling crisis, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) stated his thoughts on the 
nation’s fiscal position.  “I think Congress has failed,” he noted bluntly before concluding 
that the only solution to the nation’s fiscal problems was a balanced budget amendment 
to the Constitution.
48
 
                                                             
46
 Table 4. 
47
 Donald F. Kettl, Deficit Politics: The Search for Balance in American Politics, 2
nd
 ed. (New York: 
Longman, 2003): 108. 
48
 “Sens. Rand Paul and Mike Lee’s Colloquy on Senate Floor-12/08/2011,” uploaded to YouTube on 
December 8, 2011 by SenatorRandPaul, Office of Senator Rand Paul, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSSMR6HA2Gs (accessed April 12, 2012). 
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 Increased debt has forced members to vote more frequently on debt ceiling 
legislation.  During the 1950s, the debt ceiling was only raised six times, but in the 1960s, 
Congress was forced to raise the debt ceiling 13 times, 18 times in the 1970s, and 24 
times during the 1980s, the most increases ever in a single decade.
49
  Frequent voting on 
the debt ceiling has called attention to the national debt and added to the perception that 
Congress is incapable of limiting government spending.  In Congressional elections, 
challengers often construe incumbent votes to increase the debt ceiling as evidence that 
the incumbent favors deficit spending.  Thus, debt ceiling votes have become highly 
unpopular.
50
 
 Members also express concerns regarding the economic impact of deficit 
spending and the national debt.  Some worry that deficits contribute to unsound monetary 
policy and inflation.  Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) noted in a 1981 hearing that, “It is 
the accelerated and accumulated Federal deficits over a period of years that is the major 
case of the inflation that is so damaging to the average American.”51  Members also 
criticize the effects deficits have on business.  In a 1989 hearing of the Senate Budget 
Committee, Senator Terry Sanford (D-NC) described a series of business difficulties 
resulting from deficit spending including “the high cost of capital to trouble finding well-
educated workers, to an increasingly short-term focus among institutional investors in our 
                                                             
49
 Bill Heniff, Jr., “Legislative Procedure for Adjusting the Public Debt Limit: A Brief Overview,” 
Congressional Research Service (May 2, 2011): 5. 
50 Arnold, 106. 
51
 Senate Finance Committee: Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management, Public Debt Limit—1981, 
97
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., February 4, 1981, 2, http://www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING-
ID=HRG-1981-FNS-0002 (accessed April 12, 2012).  
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stock markets, to high interest rates…”52  Finally, members like Senator Mike Lee (R-
UT), question whether the government can even function under extreme levels of debt.  
In his maiden speech to the Senate on March 1, 2010, Lee declared that “Our perpetual 
deficit spending habit places in jeopardy every single aspect of the operations of the 
federal government.”53 
 Lastly, there appears to be deeply rooted symbolic considerations that help 
explain why debt is so troubling for members of Congress.  In Balanced Budgets and 
American Politics, James Savage concludes that United States politics idealizes balanced 
budgets as the pinnacle of government efficiency and limited government.  He refers to 
this symbolism as the “budget balancing principle.”54  This symbolic value is not based 
on any sort of economic justification.  In fact, the preponderance of evidence suggests 
that deficit spending can be a fairly useful mechanism for aiding the economy through 
recessions.  Furthermore, politicians rarely make the distinction between the debt or 
deficit’s relation to GDP, or any other order of magnitude.  Instead, it is the simple fact 
that the budget is not balanced or that the national debt has increased that frustrates 
advocates of the balanced budget principle.
55
  This is an important qualification because 
as our survey of US fiscal history tells us, with the exception of World War II and a few 
                                                             
52
 Senator Budget Committee, Impact of the Deficit and the National Debt on the Business Community, 
101
st
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., November 6, 1989, 1-2, http://www.lexisnexis.com/congcomp/getdoc?HEARING-
ID=HRG-1989-BGS-0006 (accessed April 12, 2012).  
53
 “Senator Mike Lee’s Maiden Floor Speech,” uploaded to YouTube on March 1, 2011 by senatormikelee, 
Office of Senator Mike Lee, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xS5CyNubTSs&list=PL83A9DCF187F6B091&index=4&feature=plpp
_video (accessed April 8, 2011). 
54
 Savage, 1-8. 
55
 Ibid, 18, 39-41. 
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years after, both deficits and debt remained at fairly moderate levels, in comparison to 
GDP, until the 1980s.
56
   
 Members of Congress, especially fiscal conservatives, remain devoted to the 
balanced budget principle, even in the post-1950s period.  In a 1960 hearing of the 
Subcommittee on Government Operations, Congressman James A. Haley (D-FL) evoked 
the balanced budget principle in making his case for debt reduction.  Haley told the 
committee, “I believe fiscal responsibility can be achieved, that Federal spending can be 
reduced and the budget balanced, and inasmuch as I am firmly convinced that something 
must be done to bring about an orderly retirement of the public debt…”57  Here we see 
Haley equating fiscal responsibility with balanced budgets.  For Haley, a non-balanced 
budget cannot be considered responsible budgeting.  Members have also alluded to the 
balanced budget principle by comparing the federal government to a family, or calling for 
the government to “live within its means.”58  In a House floor speech on February 4, 
2010, Congressman Steven Kagan (D-WI) makes both of these comparisons, 
“Everywhere I go in Wisconsin, people are saying the same thing: Government must live 
within its means…People all across northeast Wisconsin pay their bills on time…”59  
Thus, we see that the balanced budget principle is very much a part of the current 
political debate on the national debt.   
The Debt Ceiling as a Check on Executive Borrowing 
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 In the post-1950s period, these concerns over the national debt have led members 
to use the debt ceiling as a check on federal borrowing.  Kowalcky and LeLoup refer to 
this as member’s “managerial” use of the debt ceiling.60  Even though the national debt 
has steadily increased since the creation of the debt ceiling, some members believe that 
the national debt would be higher without the debt ceiling.  However, using the debt 
ceiling in this capacity has created contentious votes, and in some cases, precipitated full 
blown crisis.   
 The first attempts to use the debt ceiling as a check on federal borrowing occurred 
during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.  Prior to 1950, members viewed 
raising the debt ceiling votes as inevitable,
61
 but in the 1950s and 1960s, members shifted 
their attitudes and blamed the Treasury Department for the increasing national debt.  In a 
1954 Senate Finance Committee hearing, Senator John Williams (R-DE) told Treasury 
officials who had come to explain the need to raise the debt ceiling that they “have less 
excuse for a debt ceiling today than you had two months ago…”62  The choice of the 
word “excuse” in this case is telling, as it suggests that the Treasury must have done 
something wrong to warrant the need to raise the debt ceiling.  Therefore, Congress was 
not obligated to completely comply with requests debt ceiling increases.
63
   
 Early initiatives to use the debt ceiling as a check on executive borrowing took 
various forms.  Until 1983, Congress had the discretion to pass either a temporary 
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increase in the debt ceiling that would expire at a future date, or a permanent increase in 
the debt ceiling, which did not have a time limit.  Often, Congress would take advantage 
of this distinction and pass temporary debt ceiling increases, which were more palatable 
for members.  Temporary increases were also designed to force Treasury to lower the 
debt prior to the limit’s expiration debate.  However, Treasury typically ignored the time 
limit and simply requested subsequent increases upon expiration.
64
  In other cases, 
Congress criticized Treasury for requesting increases that were too large and sometimes 
refused to provide the full amount of the increase requested.
65
  For example, in 1967 
Congress voted down a debt ceiling increase (H.R. 10328) for the first time in history
66
 
because they believed the proposed $80 billion increase was uncalled for.
67
  Lastly, in 
one odd case in 1953-1954, the Senate Finance Committee flatly refused to draw up debt 
ceiling legislation because they believed a debt ceiling increase was not warranted.  As a 
result, the Treasury Department had to sell gold reserves to prevent default.
68
  It was not 
until a year after Eisenhower’s request that Congress finally agreed to raise the debt 
ceiling and even then, Congress only approved a $6 billion increase, rather than the $15 
billion Eisenhower requested.  In response, Eisenhower voiced his displeasure, noting 
that the new limit might be “inadequate”.69     
 Early efforts to use the debt ceiling as a check on federal borrowing failed to slow 
debt accumulation.  However, rather than abandon using the debt ceiling in this capacity, 
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members altered their debt ceiling tactics and began attempting to exploit the debt 
ceiling’s status as “must-pass” legislation.70  The debt ceiling assumes this quality 
because the consequences of default are typically considered unacceptable.  Thus, 
members would appear more inclined to vote for bills with controversial provisions 
attached to debt ceiling legislation than they would under normal legislative 
circumstances.   
 During the 1970s, members often attached non-germane amendments to debt 
ceiling resolutions in order to secure the passage of pet projects and other controversial 
legislation.  In the 1980s, this tactic changed slightly and members began attempting to 
attach deficit reduction packages to debt ceiling legislation, a trend that continues into the 
present.
71
  Attaching deficit reduction plans to debt ceiling legislation creates greater 
potential for crisis by complicating the already tenuous negotiations that accompany debt 
ceiling legislation.  We have seen that members consistently struggle over both the 
duration and size of the debt ceiling increase and that securing even a simple, clean 
increase has become increasingly difficult.  Including deficit reduction negotiations with 
debt ceiling increases adds another dimension to the negotiations.  Not surprisingly, all 
three of the crises we will soon discuss stemmed from members’ inability to agree on the 
terms of deficit reduction packages.   
 Members of Congress and other experts remain divided on the acceptability of 
attaching deficit reduction plans to debt ceiling legislation.  Some fear the consequences 
that could arise if a deficit reduction amendment scuttles plans for a debt ceiling increase.  
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In a 1985 Senate Finance Committee hearing on the debt ceiling, Senator Robert 
Packwood (R-OR) noted that, “The debt ceiling bill is not the place to battle out our 
philosophical differences about whether we are spending too much or too little on 
Medicaid or defense or Social Security or highways, or whatever else we may choose to 
spend it on.”72  Packwood observed that deficit reduction requires discussing of some of 
the country’s most politically divisive issues.  It was therefore unwise to essentially hold 
the fate of the nation in the balance while members attempt to reach agreements on issues 
where compromise is already difficult.  Members should thus minimize the risk of default 
by passing clean debt ceiling increases.  However, other members, such as Steve Symms 
(R-ID), disagreed.  In the same 1985 Senate Finance Committee hearing, Symms 
declared that “I am not going to vote for this debt increase unless there is some spending 
restraint coupled with it.  And as far as I am concerned, the mechanism is there.”73  
Unlike Packwood, Symms believed the debt ceiling provides the impetus for serious 
deficit negotiations and provided political cover for what was otherwise a highly 
unpopular vote.   
Conclusion 
 In the post-1950 era, member concerns with the national debt have led to attempts 
to use the debt ceiling to limit federal borrowing.  These efforts have proven unsuccessful 
and have contributed to more contentious debt ceiling votes.  In particular, members’ 
attempts to attach deficit reduction plans to debt ceiling legislation have directly 
precipitated a number of crises.  This practice adds another element to already tenuous 
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negotiations and forces members to confront divisive issues on which it is difficult to 
reach compromise under the best of legislative circumstances.  Accordingly, members 
remain divided on whether this practice should ultimately be part of the debt ceiling 
procedure.   
The Impact of Divided Government on Debt Ceiling Crisis 
Introduction 
 Kowalcky and LeLoup refer to the party composition of the government as the 
“crucial variable” in explaining debt ceiling votes.74  Different combinations of party 
control lead to varying degrees of potential for debt ceiling crisis.  Unified government 
leads to less contentious debt ceiling votes, while divided government creates greater 
potential for crisis.  Significantly, in the post-World War II era, the prevalence of divided 
government has increased.  Thus, we would expect to see more instances of debt ceiling 
crisis since World War II, which proves to be the case.   
Unified Government: Low Potential for Crisis 
 Because debt ceiling votes typically splinter along partisan lines, there is little 
chance of debt ceiling crisis under divided government.  Members of the president’s party 
determine the terms of the increase and vote in favor.  Conversely, members of the 
minority party play little significant role in determining the terms of the increase and vote 
against it.  Due to sheer numerical advantages, the legislation typically passes with little 
contention.
75
  For example, President Obama’s 2009 attempt to raise the debt ceiling due 
                                                             
74
 Kowalcky and LeLoup, 14. 
75
 Ibid, 20-22. 
D’Alessio 23 
 
to the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (H.R. 1, P.L. 
111-5), better known as the stimulus bill, presents an excellent example of the customary 
voting behavior under unified government.  In the House, the resolution passed 246-183, 
solely on the basis of the Democratic majority, which voted in favor 246-7.  House 
Republican voted against the measure 0-176.
76
  Further, this vote demonstrates the more 
restrained nature of partisanship in the Senate.  In the Senate, the bill passed 60-38, with 
Democrats in favor 55-0.  However, two Republican Senators voted in favor.
77
  
 The partisan nature of debt ceiling votes is due in part to member ideology.  
Members view debt ceiling votes as a means of clarifying partisan differences on 
economic policy.
78
  Therefore, members of the president’s party vote in favor of 
increasing the debt ceiling to show support for the president’s policies. In contrast, 
minority members oppose the president’s policies and therefore vote against an increase 
in the debt ceiling.
79
  For instance, in the aforementioned debt ceiling increase stemming 
from President Obama’s stimulus bill, Republicans opposed the increase on the 
ideological grounds that the stimulus represented excessive government intervention in 
the economy.  Meanwhile, Democrats saw the bill as necessary to help the struggling 
economy.
80
   
 Political motivations also contribute to the partisan nature of debt ceiling notes.  
Under unified government, the president’s party assumes responsibility for governing, 
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including raising the debt ceiling.
81
  The “must-pass” nature of the debt ceiling means 
that failure to raise the debt ceiling is simply not an option.  Besides the economic 
consequences that would arise from default, the majority party would suffer incredible 
political damage.  Consequently, members of the majority party will go to great lengths 
to prevent a potential crisis.  For example, the majority party in the Senate often finds 
itself forced to take unpopular votes due to the Gephardt Rule.  If an amendment is 
successfully attached to a debt ceiling increase passed via the Gephardt Rule, the House 
must vote separately on the resolution, a development would increase the possibility of 
crisis.  However, due to the debt ceiling’s tremendous importance, Senators have proven 
willing to endure tremendous political damage on these votes in order to protect the 
House from a separate debt ceiling vote.    
 One such example occurred in April of 2003 when minority Senate Democrats 
attempted to attach policy amendments to a debt ceiling resolution (H.J. Res 51) passed 
through the House via the Gephardt Rule.  Significant proposed amendments included 
changes to federal unemployment insurance, an extension of pay-as-you-go rules, and a 
rule prohibiting the Social Security trust fund from being used to pay off federal debt.  
All of the amendments were designed for “maximum political effect”.82  Nevertheless, 
the Republican leadership in the Senate successfully ensured that none of the 
amendments passed.
83
  However, it is inevitable that these votes dealt at least some 
political damage to Republican Senators.     
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 From the minority’s perspective, debt ceiling votes present an unparalleled 
opportunity to score political points.  Knowing that the increase will ultimately pass, 
minority members can vote against the debt ceiling to protest borrowing and the 
“profligate ways of the other party”. 84  In this way, a vote against the debt ceiling is not 
intended as a vote in favor of default.   Methods for scoring political points via the debt 
ceiling are varied.  At the most basic level, minority members may take the opportunity 
to make floor speeches opposing the increased debt limit.
85
  In more extreme cases, 
members of the minority force as many majority party members to vote in favor of the 
debt ceiling as possible before voting themselves.  For instance, during the Reagan 
administration, the minority Democrats in the Senate would often stand aside on debt 
ceiling votes and ensure that a majority of Republican Senators voted in favor of the 
legislation before voting themselves.
86
  In another example from the Reagan 
administration, these same Senate Democrats ensured that one of the first major votes of 
the Reagan administration would be an increase in the debt ceiling.  After running an 
election railing against the national debt and deficits, voting on the debt ceiling straight 
away was not how Reagan hoped to begin his time in office.
87
  Lastly, as we have already 
seen, the minority may attempt to attach various amendments to debt ceiling increases.     
Exceptions: House Republicans 
                                                             
84
 "Rancorous Session, Landmark Year: Inauguration, Economy, Health Care," in CQ Almanac 2009, 65th 
ed., edited by Jan Austin, 1-3-1-9, Washington, DC: CQ-Roll Call Group, 2010, 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal09-1183-59532-2251040 (accessed April 12, 
2012). 
85
 Kowalcky and LeLoup, 14. 
86
 Ibid, 22. 
87
 Ibid. 
D’Alessio 26 
 
 While members consistently vote in favor of debt ceiling resolutions when the 
sitting president is of their party, House Republicans prove a critical exception.
88
  Even 
with a Republican president, a majority of House Republicans rarely vote in favor of a 
debt ceiling increase.  Voting data demonstrates that a majority of House Republicans 
usually support the first debt ceiling increase under a new Republican president, before 
gradually limiting their support.  This trend likely stems from House Republicans’ 
staunch fiscal conservatism.  Voting for the debt ceiling is essentially a vote to authorize 
borrowing, an idea that runs contrary to conservative beliefs.  This behavior was highly 
evident during the Reagan administration where the President received a majority of 
House Republican support on his first debt ceiling increase in 1981, but support dwindled 
on subsequent increases.  A similar pattern can be observed under Republican Presidents 
Eisenhower and Nixon,
89
 although it is not as prominent under Presidents George H.W. 
Bush and George W. Bush.
90
   
Exceptions: Intraparty Conflict  
 While debt ceiling crisis is rare under unified government, we do see instances of 
some highly contentious votes due to conflict within the majority party.  For an excellent 
example, we again turn to the Obama administration.  In 2009, despite majorities in the 
House and Senate, an intraparty dispute in the Democratic Party necessitated an 
emergency short-term debt ceiling increase (H.R. 4314, P.L. 111-123).  The dispute 
stemmed from moderate House Democrats’ insistence that any debt ceiling resolution 
include an amendment for the introduction of pay-as-you-go budgeting rules (PAYGO).  
                                                             
88
 LeLoup, 48. 
89
 Ibid, 48. 
90
 Table 6. 
D’Alessio 27 
 
PAYGO rules would require any legislation altering mandatory spending levels or 
revenue laws to be “budget neutral”, meaning that it would not increase the deficit.  
Additionally, moderate Senate Democrats had their own demands, advocating for the 
creation of a deficit reduction commission which would recommend measures to deal 
with the national debt.
91
   
 After the passage of the short-term increase, the Democratic leadership worked to 
placate moderates in the House and Senate and eventually succeeded in passing a longer 
debt ceiling increase (H.J. Res 45, P.L. 111-139).  House Democrats received the 
inclusion of the PAYGO rules, which satisfied enough moderate Democrats to secure 
passage.
92
  Moderate Senators were granted a vote on an amendment to create a 
bipartisan deficit commission, but the amendment failed 53-46.
93
  In response, President 
Barack Obama used an executive order to create the eighteen-member National 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, which ultimately proved sufficient to 
secure enough votes for passage.
94
 
Divided Government: High Potential for Crisis  
                                                             
91
 "Short-Term Debt Increase Cleared," in CQ Almanac 2009, 65th ed., edited by Jan Austin, 4-13, 
Washington, DC: CQ-Roll Call Group, 2010, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal09-1183-59535-
2251243 (accessed April 12, 2012).  
92
 David Clarke and Joseph J. Schatz, "Congress Votes to Increase Debt Limit," CQ Weekly (December 28, 
2009): 2953, http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/document.php?id=weeklyreport111-000003273508 
(accessed April 12, 2012). 
93
 "Pay-As-You-Go Provisions Return," in CQ Almanac 2010, 66th ed., edited by Jan Austin, 4-12-4-13, 
Washington, DC: CQ-Roll Call Group, 2011, 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal10-1278-70358-2371569 (accessed April 12, 
2012). 
94
 "Debt Panel Report Fails to Reach Hill," in CQ Almanac 2010, 66th ed., edited by Jan Austin, 4-11-4-12, 
Washington, DC: CQ-Roll Call Group, 2011, 
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal10-1278-70358-2371567 (accessed April 12, 
2012). 
D’Alessio 28 
 
 In the post-World War II era, divided government has become increasingly 
common.  Morris P. Fiorina writes in Divided Government that since World War II 
“divided government has become a defining feature of contemporary American politics—
it it the normal state of affairs.”95  The data supports this claim.  Of the 26 presidential 
and midterm elections between 1900 and 1952, only four (15.4%) resulted in divided 
government.  In contrast in the twenty-nine presidential and midterm elections from 
1952-present, eighteen (62%) left the government divided.
96
  Even more striking, of the 
sixteen presidential and midterm elections from 1980-present, eleven resulted in divided 
government (69%).
97
  Thus, we can expect to see more instances of debt ceiling crises 
since World War II and specifically since 1980, which is in fact the reality.   
 Debt ceiling votes under divided government split along partisan lines, just as 
during unified government.  However, under divided government the partisan nature of 
debt ceiling votes means that the parties must compromise in order to raise the debt 
ceiling.  This is a difficult proposition because under divided government, political 
motivations often trump members’ desire to pass legislation.  In fact, members will 
sometimes sacrifice policy victories for political victories.  Kernell notes that “Opposition 
politicians will sometimes find electoral advantage in frustrating the other side, even 
when doing so prevents them from satisfying their own policy goals.”98  Because 
members are not primarily concerned with passing legislation, there is little incentive to 
cooperate with the opposing party.  Instead, members attempt to inflict damage on the 
opposing party in the hopes of gaining complete control of the government in the next 
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election.
99
  This means that members may even take action to ensure that the branch or 
branches of government controlled by the opposing party fails to function properly.
100
  In 
other cases, members may negotiate, but this is often more a political show than a 
substantial negotiation.
101
   
 On most pieces of legislation, members’ lack of incentive to cooperate is not a 
major problem.  If the parties cannot agree on the terms of the legislation and fail to pass 
a bill, the policy status quo continues.  But on debt ceiling legislation, if the parties 
cannot compromise, the nation defaults.  Despite this danger, members still attempt to use 
the debt ceiling vote to inflict damage upon the other party.  In fact, members seem to 
believe that the threat of default will force the opposing party into concessions they 
would not otherwise make.  Accordingly, debt ceiling crises result in a game of political 
chicken, where each party sticks to their position for as long as possible in the hopes that 
the other party will back down.  Therefore, debt ceiling crises are rarely resolved until 
just prior to default.   
 Central to debt ceiling negotiations under divided government is the idea that each 
party wants to be seen as using the debt ceiling to defeat the opposing party.  In this way, 
members hope that the debt ceiling contributes to their party assuming complete control 
of the government in the next election.  However, according to Helmut Norpoth, voters 
have a difficult time determining where to allocate responsibility for economic policy, 
and it would seem by extension, the debt ceiling.  For example, following the midterm 
elections of 2006, Democrats gained control of both houses of Congress, opposing 
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Republican President George W. Bush.  In the debate over debt ceiling legislation in 
2006, Congressional Democrats blamed the need to raise the debt ceiling on the deficits 
created by President Bush’s tax cuts in 2001 and 2003.  Conversely, Republicans 
defended the tax cuts and concluded that the debt ceiling increase was the product of the 
expenditures from the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, fought in response to the September 11 
terrorist attacks.
102
  Thus, we see both parties attempting to clarify where the public 
should place the blame for the state of fiscal policy. 
   Norpoth elaborates on this issue by proposing four outcomes that voters could 
choose from when assigning responsibility for economic policy: Hung Jury, Split 
Verdict, President Liable, and Congress Liable.  In Hung Jury, the public does not render 
a judgment.  In a Split Verdict, the public divides the blame between the parties.  Under 
President Liable, the public blames the president exclusively.  Conversely, under 
Congress Liable, the public blames Congress exclusively.
103
  Norpoth ultimately 
concludes that President Liable is the most common outcome.  However, in some cases 
the public has appeared to blame Congress.
104
   
 This finding has tremendous implications for debt ceiling votes.  For our 
purposes, it would seem that the public would give the president responsibility for raising 
the debt ceiling under divided government, even though Congress actually plays a much 
greater role in the negotiations.  Thus, the debt ceiling becomes an asymmetric threat to 
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the president.  Consequently, we can deduce that members of Congress and the president 
have very different incentives on debt ceiling legislation.  The president, fearing the 
blame that would come with default, prefers a less contentious negotiation.  Meanwhile, 
members of the opposition party in Congress can be more aggressive and attempt to 
impose the terms of the debt ceiling increase upon the president, reasoning that the 
president would have to capitulate for fear of being blamed for default.   
 The president does have one significant weapon to combat Congressional 
attempts to force him into an undesirable debt ceiling increase: the veto.  However, the 
veto is a defensive tactic, as it can only be utilized once Congress has passed 
legislation.
105
  Nevertheless, the veto is still a powerful tactic.  Kernell notes that from 
1945-1990, presidents used the veto 716 times.  In only 44 cases (6%) was Congress able 
to override the veto.
106
  In some cases even the simple threat of veto can be enough to 
force Congress to change its course.  However, Frances E. Lee observes that presidential 
involvement on an issue, in this case by a veto threat, heightens the potential for 
Congress to score a political victory against the president and therefore leads to enhanced 
partisan resistance.
107
  For this reason, Congress has been known to call the president’s 
bluff on veto threats.
108
  
 The potential of the veto on debt ceiling legislation is intriguing.  The “must pass” 
nature of the debt ceiling means that any veto of debt ceiling legislation has the potential 
to develop into a crisis.  As discussed previously, overriding a veto is a very tough 
endeavor and rarely takes place.  Thus, if the president vetoes a debt ceiling increase, 
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there is a distinct possibility that Congress may not be able to reform the legislation to 
make it palatable for the president prior to default.  In this case, it is almost certain that 
the president would be blamed for the ensuing default.  Despite the huge risks present in 
using the veto on debt ceiling legislation, there are instances of presidents vetoing debt 
ceiling legislation.
109
  One instance occurred in 1980 when President Carter vetoed debt 
ceiling legislation because the increase (H.R. 7428) contained an amendment repealing 
the President’s oil import fee.  Congress successfully overrode the veto.110   
 Lastly, the impact of divided government on fiscal policy is also important for our 
examination of the debt ceiling.  Lloyd Cutler concludes that that “High deficits occur 
when the President and Congress cannot form a consensus on a mix of taxes and 
competing expenditure programs that will create a reasonable balance between inflows 
and outflows.”111  Thus, Cutler blames divided government for irresponsible budgeting in 
the post-World War II era.
112
  However, Fiorina refutes this point, noting that “it is not 
divided control in and of itself, but divided control in conjunction with other important 
considerations, that produces fiscal problems.”113 Essentially, there is no evidence that 
deficits increase more under divided government than unified government.  Instead, 
Fiorina suggests that divided government makes it harder for Congress and the President 
to pass legislation to deal with pre-existing deficits.
114
  If this is indeed the case, then it 
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would help explain why members’ recent efforts to attach deficit reduction plans to debt 
ceiling legislation have experienced so much difficulty and created crisis.    
Divided Government: Predictions 
 Taking this all into consideration, we can formulate predictions for the two 
different types of divided government.  In the first type of divided government, we have a 
united Congress opposing the president.  Under this scenario, Congress can usually agree 
upon the conditions for raising the debt ceiling, just as they would under unified 
government.  For example, following the midterm elections of 2006, the Democrats 
gained control of both houses of Congress.  In the two remaining years of Bush’s second 
term, the debt ceiling was raised three times, although one increase took place due to the 
Gephardt Rule, meaning there were only two votes in the House.  Now responsible for 
governing, House and Senate Democrats passed each increase with comfortable 
majorities.
115
  Under this type of divided government, we would also expect the Congress 
to attempt to force the president into concessions.  The president would then have to 
decide whether to accept the terms of the increase or veto the legislation and risk being 
blamed for default.  This scenario played out in 1995-1996 between Congressional 
Republicans and President Clinton. 
  Under the second scenario of divided government, the president and one House 
of Congress belong to the same party, while the second house of Congress is controlled 
by the other party.  This scenario creates the greatest potential for crisis because two 
compromises must take place.  First, the two houses of Congress must agree upon the 
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terms of a debt ceiling increase.  Then, the president must also accept these terms.  As we 
have already seen, it is often difficult for Congress to compromise and when a second 
compromise is necessitated, the probability of crisis only increases.   
 There is one interesting caveat under this scenario of divided government, which 
actually further heightens the possibility of crisis.  This takes place when there is a 
Democratic president and Senate aligned against a Republican House.  As previously 
discussed, House Republicans are traditionally averse to voting in favor of the debt 
ceiling.  In this scenario, a non-contentious debt ceiling increase would bolster the overall 
perception of the Democratic Party.  Thus, it would seem that House Republicans 
actually have further incentive to drag out the dispute, and force the Democrats to cater to 
their demands.  This is exactly the scenario we see play out in the summer of 2011, as we 
will soon discuss in further detail. 
 Party Polarization and Partisanship on Debt Ceiling Votes 
 In “Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock,” David R. Jones concludes that 
the amount of partisanship under divided government contributes directly to the degree of 
gridlock that takes place.
116
  Significantly, debt ceiling votes are some of the most 
partisan votes taken by members of Congress and therefore, we can expect tremendous 
gridlock.  The heightened degree of partisanship on debt ceiling votes is illustrated in the 
graph below.  The graph plots the mean party difference on debt ceiling votes compared 
to all votes for the 83
rd
 Congress-110
th
 Congress, a period encompassing 1953-2009.  
Notably, there are some years in which no debt ceiling votes took place and accordingly, 
                                                             
116
 David R. Jones, “Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock,” Political Research Quarterly Vol. 54, 
No. 1 (March 2001): 137, published by Sage Publications on behalf of the University of Utah, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/449211 (accessed April 12, 2012).  
D’Alessio 35 
 
for these years there is no bar for debt ceiling votes.  However, it is clear that on the 
whole, the mean party difference is markedly higher for debt ceiling votes compared to 
all other votes.  Further, there are a number of years in which the mean party difference 
score approaches 1, indicating a completely partisan vote.  This point is corroborated by 
Table 1, located at the end of this paper, which classifies debt ceiling votes from 1953-
2008 as either bipartisan or partisan, depending on the voting breakdown.  The chart 
underscores the fact that debt ceiling votes are highly partisan.
117
   
Figure 1.  Mean party difference on debt limit votes and all votes, 83
rd
 Congress-
110
th
 Congress 
 
 
Mean party difference is the average across relevant votes of the absolute value of the proportion of 
Republicans voting yes minus the proportion of Democrats voting yes.  In other words, a party difference 
score of 1 means that all Republicans voted on one side and all Democrats voted on the other, while a party 
difference score of zero means that the same proportion of Republicans and Democrats voted the same 
way.
 118
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 Notably, since the middle of the twentieth century, the degree of partisan conflict 
in the United States Congress has increased, along with the degree of polarization 
between the parties.
119
  To some extent, these trends go hand-in-hand.  As the parties 
become more polarized, it follows that they would be more likely to enter into conflict 
and less likely to cooperate.  However, in Beyond Ideology, France E. Lee observes that 
the level of partisanship demonstrated in Congress is greater than one would expect if 
ideological differences were the only reason for partisan conflict.
120
  Further, she 
demonstrates that the two parties consistently clash on issues that have no real ideological 
value, such as Congressional ethics reform.  Lee thus concludes that partisan conflict is 
based on more than simple ideology.  Members recognize that their party affiliation 
means their individual electoral fate is largely tied to that of the party.  In a two party 
system, one party will win and the other will lose.  Therefore, parties have a natural 
tendency to oppose each other and members have an incentive to cooperate with their 
party in order to hopefully benefit from its enhanced political position.  Thus, for Lee, the 
increase in partisan conflict is due to a combination of ideological polarization and better 
intraparty teamwork.
121
  If we apply these insights towards the debt ceiling, it follows that 
we would see more difficult debt ceiling increases. 
 Furthermore, Lee examines a series of issues, including economic issues, social 
issues, and national defense, in order to determine which types of issues illicit the greatest 
degree of partisanship.  Lee concludes that economic issues illicit the strongest partisan 
responses when compared to social issues, national defense, and other issues.  She notes 
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that, “disagreement over the government’s role in the economy clearly figures as the most 
important ideological issue differentiating the parties.”122  The debt ceiling is essentially 
an economic issue and therefore, we would expect to see heightened levels of partisan 
conflict on debt ceiling votes.    
Conclusions 
 Divided government creates debt ceiling crises.  Under divided government, 
members have little incentive to cooperate with the opposing party.  In fact, many 
members appear to neglect their legislative duties in favor of attempting to score political 
points against the opposing party.  This lack of incentive creates tremendous problems on 
debt ceiling resolutions because failing to raise the debt ceiling is not an option in the 
way it is for other pieces of legislation.  Nevertheless, members continue to exploit debt 
ceiling legislation, often attempting to force the opposing party into making significant 
concessions.  This creates a game of political chicken in which it is highly unlikely that 
either party will agree to a compromise until just prior to the default deadline.  
Furthermore, increased partisanship has increased the difficulty of securing the necessary 
compromises under divided government.  Thus, our current period of extended periods of 
divided government and increased partisanship is ripe with the possibility for crisis, 
which proves to be the case.    
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Section 3: Cases 
 In the following section, we examine three debt ceiling crises in greater detail: 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (1985), Clinton vs. Gingrich (1995-1996), and the summer of 
2011.   
I. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (1985) 
Background 
 During the 1980 president campaign, Ronald Reagan, the Republican nominee, 
drew a stark contrast between his proposed economic policies and incumbent President 
Carter’s economic policies.  In particular, Reagan criticized Carter for inflation and 
deficit spending, which he believed were restricting economic growth.  Balancing the 
budget, Reagan claimed, was the key to turning the economy around.
123
  It was a message 
that resonated with voters.  Reagan handily defeated Carter, winning the popular vote 
43.9 million to 35.5 million, or 50.7% to 41.0%.   In the Electoral College, Reagan’s 
victory was even more impressive, as he captured forty-four states, for a margin of 
victory or 489-49.
124
  Further, Republican Congressional candidates rode Regan’s 
coattails to victory, drastically altering the partisan composition of Congress.  In the 
Senate, Republicans gained 13 seats, turning a 59-41 deficit into a 54-46 majority.  
Significantly, it was the first time Republicans controlled a house of Congress since 
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1957.  Republicans also enjoyed success in the House of Representatives, cutting a 117 
seat Democratic majority to a more manageable 51 seat majority.
125
   
 Upon assuming office, Reagan acted quickly to prepare a budget for fiscal year 
1982, hoping to take advantage of what he believed to be a mandate for significant 
changes in economic policy.  His controversial FY1982 budget called for drastic 
reductions in domestic spending, huge tax cuts, as well as significant increases in military 
spending.
126
  Relying on a series of questionable economic assumptions, Reagan’s 
economic team believed these policies would create economic growth and achieve a 
balanced budget by 1984.  House Democrats resisted Reagan’s efforts, but recognized 
that their political position was not ideal for staunch opposition.  As a result, they allowed 
the Republicans to achieve most of what he wanted in the fiscal 1982 budget.
127
 
 However, House Democrats used the debt ceiling to voice their displeasure with 
Reagan’s policies.  In fact, once Reagan assumed office, one of the first tasks confronting 
him was the need to raise the debt ceiling.  Reagan secured the necessary increase (H.R. 
1553, P.L. 97-2), but Congressional Republicans bore the political cost.
 128
  In the Senate, 
many Democrats refused to vote until a majority of Republicans had voted in favor of the 
increase, hoping to emphasize the irony of a deficit-obsessed Republican delegation 
voting in favor of raising the debt ceiling.
129
  In 1981, when Reagan increased the debt 
ceiling for the second time (H. J. Res 265, P.L. 97-49), House Democrats again used the 
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debt ceiling to score political points, this time by attempting to attach amendments 
repealing various aspects of Reagan’s tax reforms.  This second debt ceiling increase put 
the debt ceiling over $1 trillion for the first time in the nation’s history, a distinction that 
further damaged Reagan’s deficit slashing credentials.130   
  As Reagan’s first term progressed, House Republican support for raising the debt 
ceiling steadily decreased.  In fact, after Reagan’s initial debt ceiling increase (H.R. 
1553), a majority of House Republicans only voted in favor of raising the debt ceiling 
once more throughout the remainder of Reagan’s presidency (H.R. 5953).131  Republican 
support on budget resolutions also steadily eroded, culminating in 1983 when huge 
majorities of both House and Senate Republicans actually opposed the budget resolution, 
forcing Reagan to rely on House Democrats to pass the resolution.  Reagan’s difficulties 
with the 1983 budget foreshadowed later budget difficulties.  Throughout the remainder 
of his presidency, the need to pass a budget often necessitated budget summits in order to 
resolve partisan differences.  The 1983 budget also underscores the increased role of 
House Democrats played in budget negotiations after they strengthened their majorities in 
the 1982 midterm elections.
132
 
 Reagan won a landslide victory for re-election in 1984, defeating Walter Mondale 
525-13 in the Electoral College.  However, the partisan breakdown in Congress remained 
almost the same.  In the Senate, Republicans held a 53-47 advantage and in the House, 
Democrats maintained a majority, 253-182.  Further, Reagan’s budget for fiscal year 
1896, the first of his second term, proved particularly contentious.  Differences of opinion 
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in the House and Senate over potential changes in entitlement programs proved so 
difficult to resolve that Congress agreed to forgo the passage of a formal budget 
resolution.  Instead, Congress relied on the passage of individual appropriations bills to 
fund the government.  The battle also created divisions between Senate Republicans and 
President Reagan.  Republican Senators had pushed hard for reforms to entitlement 
programs to achieve deficit reduction, but in the end, Reagan supported the less drastic 
reforms of the House plan.
133
 
  The Events 
  In late September 1985, freshmen Senators Phil Gramm (R-TX) and Warren B. 
Rudman (R-NH), teamed with veteran conservative Democrat Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC) 
to propose a radical deficit reduction plan.  The legislation, known as the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Gramm-Rudman Hollings, or just 
Gramm-Rudman, attempted to achieve gradual deficit reduction through mandatory 
spending cuts.  Each year, $36 billion in cuts would take place, resulting in a balanced 
budget at the start of fiscal year 1991, October 1, 1990.  If the deficit for a given year was 
projected to exceed the target, the cuts would take place automatically through a process 
known as sequestration.
134
    
 To increase the bill’s chances of passing, the Republican leadership in the Senate 
attempted to attach it as an amendment to upcoming debt ceiling legislation, concluding 
that members would support the bill rather than face the prospects of default.  Upon its 
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introduction on September 25, 1985, the Gramm-Rudman plan quickly gathered 
support.
135
  Concerns over the deficit were so elevated that virtually any serious plan was 
bound to receive substantial support.  Howard E. Shuman notes that “To vote against it 
was to vote against motherhood, the flag, and apple pie.”136  Donald Kettl concludes that 
members perceived the plan as “simple and foolproof” which appealed to their desire to 
demonstrate their concern with the deficit.
137
   In the end, the extreme anti-deficit sentient 
masked Gramm-Rudman’s serious flaws.  Some Republican Senators labeled the bill an 
abdication of the government’s duty to make difficult budget decisions.138  Others noted 
that the bill gave tremendous power to non-elected bureaucrats, such as those in the 
General Accounting Office, who would be responsible for determining whether the 
deficit targets were being reached.  Even Senator Rudman, the bill’s co-author, provided 
less than a ringing endorsement, referring to the plan as “a bad idea whose time had 
come.”139 
 The measure (S. 1702) was successfully attached to debt ceiling legislation (H.J. 
Res 372), and then passed through the Senate by a vote of 51-37 on October 10.  
Republicans supported it 39-8, while Democrats opposed it 13-29.
140
  With President 
Reagan and the Treasury Department warning that the debt ceiling needed to be raised as 
soon as possible, the bill rapidly made its way to the House.  Here, Democrats had the 
majority, but as Shuman notes, their caucus was “ill-prepared, badly divided, and had no 
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clear plan of action.”141  However, the Democrats quickly regrouped and made a shrewd 
political maneuver.  Rather than allow the bill to reach the floor for a vote in which it 
would likely pass, they opted to move directly to a conference committee.  They then 
offered their own proposal as a substitute, which would have achieved a balanced budget 
by 1990 through deeper yearly cuts.  Samuel Kernell refers to this scenario as a “bidding 
war”, a trend in divided government where the President and Congress attempt to outdo 
each other to take a stronger stance on a popular issue.
142
  The vote on the substitute fell 
on party lines 249-180, with Democrats in favor 248-2 and Republicans in opposition 1-
178.
143
  It was, as described by CQ Almanac, a “surprising show of party unity” for the 
Democrats who appeared in complete disarray at the start of deliberations.
144
  
 The differing bills subsequently went to a second conference committee and 
remained there for over a month.  The delay put the state of the nation’s finances in 
jeopardy because the national debt was rapidly approaching the limit, set to be reached in 
early October 1985.  However, Senate Republicans initially refused to consider a short-
term debt ceiling increase, reasoning that if they raised the debt ceiling, there would be 
no impetus for the completion of the negotiations on Gramm-Rudman.  As more time 
elapsed, the Treasury Department began taking extraordinary measures to avoid default.  
They further warned that if the debt ceiling was not raised prior to November 1, they 
would be forced to begin disinvesting funds from the Social Security trust.  To comply 
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with Treasury’s request, Congress passed a short-term debt ceiling increase (H.R. 3721, 
P.L. 99-155) on November 14, but it was not in time to prevent Treasury from 
disinvesting from the Social Security fund.
145
    
 Separate negotiations between party leaders ultimately bridged the necessary 
gaps.  The parties finally reached an agreement on the Gramm-Rudman plan and 
President Reagan signed the bill into law on December 13 (P.L. 99-177).  In order to 
secure passage, Republicans made a key concession, agreeing that in the event of 
sequestration, cuts would be split evenly between defense and domestic spending.  The 
final Senate vote was 61-31 in favor, with Republicans supporting the bill 39-9 and 
Democrats split 22-22.  In the House, the vote was 271-154, with Republicans 153- in 
favor and 118 Democrats in favor.  The final bill also raised the debt ceiling from $1824 
trillion to $2079 trillion.
146
 
 Conclusions  
 The Gramm-Rudman crisis provides the template for future debt ceiling crises.  
Whether or not to raise the debt ceiling was not the issue during the debate.
147
  There was 
general agreement amongst both parties that steps needed to be taken to reduce the 
deficit.  Further, concern with the debt was so high that members were willing to risk a 
potential default in order to be perceived as taking steps to restore a greater degree of 
fiscal control.  Even the House Democrats agreed to go along with the deficit reduction 
efforts, concluding that refusing to comply with the deficit reduction efforts would be a 
gross political miscalculation.  However, the presence of divided government 
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complicated moving the plan through Congress, as neither party wanted to be perceived 
as granting the other a major victory.   
 Congressional Republicans’ frustration with Reagan’s deficit cutting efforts 
played a large role in shaping the crisis.  Throughout Reagan’s first term, Republicans in 
Congress expressed optimism that Reagan could achieve deficit reduction.   For instance, 
in 1981 during the debate over H.R. 1553, the first debt ceiling increase under Reagan, 
Congressman Marjorie S. Holt (R-MD) described her hope that serious steps could be 
undertaken to curb the deficit.  She declared, “I see for the first time some glimmer of 
hope that we will bring federal spending under control.”148  However, Reagan’s deficit 
reduction efforts failed.  The deficit increased in every year from 1981-1986, reaching 
record levels in 1983 when it topped $200 billion and 6.3% of GDP.
149
  Furthermore, 
with no drastic change in the party composition of Congress in the 1984 elections, the 
chances of significant deficit reduction taking place through the normal legislative 
process seemed unlikely.    
 Republican members perceived the situation as increasingly dire.  Senator John 
Chafee (R-RI) remarked at a 1985 hearing of the Senate Finance Committee 
Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management that “I don’t think this is really a 
joking matter because, if we don’t do something about the deficits quickly, this Nation, I 
think, is going to be in very, very deep trouble.”150  Republican frustration contributed to 
declining support for Reagan’s initiatives on debt ceiling votes and budget resolutions.  
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Overall, the environment was ripe for a new approach to deficit reduction and members 
thus turned to the debt ceiling.     
   Additionally, we see that with a divided Congress, the opposition House 
Democrats, largely dictated the negotiations.  The House Democrats’ success is best 
epitomized by the inclusion of the provision requiring that sequestration cuts be split 
evenly amongst defense and domestic spending.  This was a key Democratic demand 
because it protected many domestic programs Democrats believed Republicans would 
potentially target for elimination in the name of deficit reduction.  Further, the inclusion 
of this provision demonstrates President Reagan’s fear that he would be blamed for 
default.  Reagan endorsed the Gramm-Rudman plan early on and thus could not abandon 
it in its later stages after wasting so much political capital.
151
  In fact, Reagan’s firm 
association with the plan may actually have played against him, harkening back to 
Frances Lee’s conclusion that direct presidential involvement on an issue creates greater 
partisan resistance.
152
  In the end, Reagan concluded that it was better to pass the bill with 
concessions to the Democrats, rather than continue the struggle and risk default. 
II. Clinton vs. Gingrich (1995-1996) 
Background 
 The 1992 presidential election resulted in the election of Democratic President 
Bill Clinton, the first Democratic president in twelve years.  Voters also granted 
Democrats majority control of both the House and Senate, creating a brief period of 
unified government.  LeLoup concludes that while the 1990 election lacked the explicit 
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mandate feel of other elections, the most significant issue in the election was the 
government’s need to address the deficit.153  The main accomplishment of President 
Clinton’s first term was the passage of the Omnibus-Budget Reconciliation Act (H.R. 
2264), which achieved deficit reduction through tax increases.  Additionally, the 
legislation included an increase in the debt ceiling to $4.9 trillion.
154
  However, because 
the bill relied so heavily on tax increases made it a “bitter pill” for the Democratic 
Congressional delegation to swallow, but nonetheless, Clinton secured the necessary 
votes.  By the same token, Republicans prevailed in providing a united opposition.  
LeLoup highlights the significance of the unified Republican opposition, noting that 
Senate Republicans had generally been more willing to work with Democrats in the 
past.
155
  Thus, we see that during the early years of the Clinton administration, budgeting 
votes once again proved highly partisan issues.
156
    
 Despite Clinton’s success in achieving deficit reduction, his failure to bring about 
health care reform helped Republicans gain control of both the House and Senate in the 
midterm elections of 1994, thus bringing about a return to divided government.  The 
Republican Party’s ability to seize a Congressional majority as a result of the 1994 
elections was also predicated upon the Contract with America, ten policy proposals 
Republicans promised to institute if they received majorities.  At the start of the 104
th
 
Congress in 1995, Republicans held 52-48 majority in the Senate and 230-204 majority in 
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the House of Representatives.
157
  Leading the new House Republican majority was 
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich of Georgia.  As Speaker, Gingrich had the task of 
maintaining party discipline amongst a large freshmen class of hard-line conservatives 
who shunned compromise and hoped to live up to the promises of the Contract with 
America.  Gingrich himself was known for being a prickly individual unafraid of 
confrontation.  Republicans believed that if they passed legislation quickly and gathered 
momentum, they could prevent Clinton from exercising his veto power and push through 
the Contract with America.
158
   
The Crisis    
  In 1995, Gingrich and Congressional Republicans attempted to use the debt 
ceiling as a vehicle for the passage of their plan to balance the budget.  The Republican 
plan, a massive reconciliation bill (H.R. 2491), would achieve a balanced budget within 
seven years through a combination of sweeping spending and tax cuts.  The bill also 
included a debt ceiling increase.  By including the measure in conjunction with debt 
ceiling legislation, Republicans believed they could force Clinton to accept the bill.  
Vetoing the legislation would have been tantamount to vetoing an increase in the debt 
ceiling, thereby risking the possibility of default.  The Republican leadership planned to 
hold a hard line against Clinton, with Gingrich even going so far as to say “What we are 
saying to Clinton is: Do not assume that we will flinch, because we won’t.”159   
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 The Treasury estimated that the debt limit would be reached sometime during 
September or October 1995, but that with extraordinary measures the date could be 
postponed until the middle of November.  However, Secretary of the Treasury Robert 
Rubin undercut Republicans when he announced on October 17 that the deadline would 
actually take place at the end of October.  Without sufficient time to complete their 
budget resolution, the Republicans passed a short-term debt ceiling bill (H.R. 2586), but 
attached numerous policy riders that Clinton found unpalatable, which resulted in a veto 
on November 13, 1995.  Following the veto, Rubin employed various measures to create 
additional borrowing authority in order to avoid default.  Republicans objected to certain 
tactics Rubin utilized and attempted to strip the Secretary of certain powers, but their 
efforts were unsuccessful.
160
   
 As a result of Clinton’s veto, Republicans found themselves in a difficult position, 
forced to choose between gambling that the public would blame Clinton for the default or 
backing down from their hard-line positions.  They chose the latter, passing two short-
term debt ceiling raises before passing a final long-term measure.  The first short-term 
bill, (H.R. 2924, P.L. 104-103) enacted on February 1, 1986, allowed for sufficient 
borrowing so that Social Security payments could me made during the February 
congressional recess.  A second short-term measure, (H.R. 3021, P.L. 104-115) enacted 
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on March 12, 1996, had to be passed after divisions within the Republican House 
prevented the passage of a long-term solution before H.R. 2924 expired on March 15.
161
   
 The final long-term solution paled in comparison to what the Republicans had 
initially expected to pass.  Thus, Gingrich found himself in a difficult position as more 
hard-line conservatives voiced their disapproval with the change in tactics.  In order to 
secure passage of the long-term debt ceiling increase (H.R. 3136, P.L. 104-121), the 
Republican leadership included two provisions, which House Majority Leader Dick 
Armey referred to as “sweeteners”.  These two provisions included an increase in the cap 
on lifetime benefits for Social Security and a small business package that would assist 
small businesses when challenging federal regulations.  Even with the inclusion of these 
provisions, some budget hawks refused to support the measure because there were no 
provisions to reduce the deficit or cut spending.  Despite these objections, the bill passed 
the House comfortably 328-91 on March 28, 1996, with House Republicans supporting it 
overwhelmingly, 201-30, and the Senate via voice vote also on March 28.
162
     
 The change in Republican tactics can be attributed to public perception of the two 
government shutdowns that took place during the debt ceiling crisis.  These shutdowns 
arose due to the delay in passing the budget reconciliation bill that Republicans were 
hoping to force Clinton to accept.  The first shutdown occurred after Clinton vetoed H.R. 
2586, which also contained increased spending authority, and lasted from November 14-
19.  A short-term continuing resolution (H.J. Res 122) allowed the government to reopen, 
but a second shutdown occurred from December 16-22, after the initial short-term bill 
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expired.  The second shutdown came to an end after the passage of another short-term 
spending bill (H.J. Res 136).
163
  Public opinion of the government shutdowns placed the 
blame squarely on the shoulders of the Republicans.  Clinton’s approval ranking 
increased, while opinion of Congressional Republicans soured.  Evidently, the public did 
not take kindly to what they believed were irresponsible tactics on the part of 
Republicans.  Once the Republicans realized the damage they had inflicted upon 
themselves via the government shutdowns, they quickly concluded that they could no 
longer flirt with the possibility of default.
164
   
Conclusions and Analysis 
 Once again, we see that divided government creates the potential for crisis.  With 
Congress unified against the president, President Clinton found himself in the weakest 
negotiating position in the ensuing game of political chicken.  Disciplined Republican 
majorities could essentially pass whatever legislated they wanted and force Clinton to 
decide whether or not it was worth vetoing.  Vetoing debt ceiling legislation would be a 
tremendous risk, as doing so would potentially put the nation on the edge of default.  
Thus it would seem, as the Republicans concluded, that Clinton simply could not afford 
to take the risk of vetoing debt ceiling legislation. 
 However, the events proved otherwise.  Clinton made it clear early on that he 
would not allow the Republicans to use the debt ceiling to force him into concessions.  
When confronted with the opportunity to make good on his word, he did exactly that.  
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The shift in public opinion in support of President Clinton surprised Republicans.  For 
our purposes, it demonstrates that the public will hold Congress liable for the debt ceiling 
in situations where Congress appears to be using the debt ceiling in a dangerous manner.  
Overall, Clinton emerged from the battle the clear winner, having deftly maneuvered the 
game of political chicken and called the Republicans’ bluff.    
III. The Summer of 2011 
Background 
 At the turn of the twenty-first century, the federal government finally returned to 
balanced budgets, running a surplus from 1998-2001.  Rather than the consistent talk of 
deficit reduction, the chatter on Capitol Hill changed into how best to manage the surplus.  
In fact on March 29, 2001, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing, entitled 
“Budget Surpluses and Debt Reduction.”  However, at the hearing Senator Charles 
Grassley (R-IA) warned that the fiscal picture was not as rosy as many believed.  Quite 
simply, the surpluses were not sustainable due to the rising costs of health care and the 
retirement of the baby boomers.
165
  Grassley quickly proved prophetic.  Deficit spending 
returned in 2002 and steadily increased throughout the remainder of the Bush presidency 
due to a confluence of factors including the Bush tax cuts and United States military 
action in Afghanistan and Iraq.  By 2003, deficit spending stood at 3.4% of GDP and the 
national debt at just over 60% of GDP.
166
   
 The fiscal situation took a further hit in 2008 when the stock market crashed.  In 
response, the Bush administration secured passage of a $700 billion bailout of the 
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financial services industry, which further increased the debt.
167
   Further, the economic 
fallout from the stock market crash continued into the Obama administration.  In 
response, Obama pushed through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, more 
commonly known as the stimulus package, a combination of tax cuts and government 
spending injected into the economy.  Obama also bailed out the struggling auto industry.  
Overall, between 2000 and 2009, the national debt nearly tripled and in 2009, deficit 
spending skyrocketed to 10.1% of GDP.
168
  In under a decade, the United States had 
moved from balanced budgets to dire fiscal straits.   
 The rapid debt accumulation, coupled with fallout from the passage of the 
Affordable Care Act, Obama’s signature health care bill, angered the conservative 
electoral base.  In the 2010 midterm elections, Republicans gained 63 seats in the House 
of Representatives, enough to seize a majority of 242-193, and picked up six seats in the 
Senate, reducing the Democratic majority to 53-47.
169
  It was the first Republican 
majority in the House since 2006 and the largest Republican majority in the House since 
the 80
th
 Congress in 1947-1948.
170
  Bob Benenson of CQ Weekly attributes the large 
Republican gains to two factors: the poor performance of the economy and the 
emergence of the Tea Party, a conservative populist movement which aided a number of 
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far-right Republican challengers as they defeated Democratic incumbents and won 
victories in key swing districts.
171
 
 The new Congress convened for its first session in January 2011.  In the same 
month, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner sent a letter to Congress estimating that the 
debt ceiling would need to be raised sometime between March 31 and May 16.  He 
continued by noting that “any default on the legal debt obligations of the United States is 
unthinkable and must be avoided.”172  He later adjusted his estimate for when the debt 
ceiling would need to be extended to August 2, taking into account the use of special 
tactics at the Treasury Department.
173
   
 In a spring precursor to the summer’s debt ceiling showdown, a partisan battle 
over the need to fund the government for the remainder of fiscal year 2011 nearly 
resulted in a government shutdown.  Republicans hoped to force deep spending cuts to 
demonstrate their fiscal conservatism.  They also refused to allow the inclusion of any tax 
increases.  Conversely, Democrats attempted to block cuts to social programs they 
considered important and emphasize tax increases on the wealthiest individuals as a 
means to reduce the deficit.  Only a last minute compromise which cut $38.5 billion in 
spending ensured that the government could continue operating.
174
  This early showdown 
foreshadowed the tremendous difficulty Congress would encounter when attempting to 
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raise the debt ceiling later in the year and the positions the parties would take into the 
crisis.   
The Crisis  
 In May, the top-ranking Republicans in Congress, Speaker of the House John 
Boehner and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that their respective 
caucuses would only vote to raise the debt ceiling if the legislation included measures 
that would cut spending and ameliorate the already accumulated national debt.  
Congressional Republicans also balked at the prospect of any measures that could be 
construed as a tax increase.  Tea Party members were particularly adamant about these 
demands and some even refused to raise the debt ceiling under any circumstances.  
Further, because 60 of the 242 members of the House Republican delegation identified as 
belonging to the Tea Party, these members were in a unique position to drive the 
negotiations.
175
  Republican demands ran contrary to the sentiments of President Barack 
Obama and Congressional Democrats who hoped that any cuts in federal spending would 
be coupled with increased sources of revenue.
176
   
 In the months that followed, negotiations made little progress.  On May 31, the 
House voted on a clean debt ceiling measure that would have raised the debt ceiling with 
no deficit reduction provisions attached.  The measure failed, as predicted by the 
Republican Congressional leadership, demonstrating that some deficit reduction 
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measures would need to be included to deal with the national debt.
177
  Congressional 
leaders met with Vice President Joe Biden throughout May and into June to work on the 
terms of these conditions.  However, talks broke down on June 23, after House Majority 
Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) abandoned the negotiations, claiming he would not tolerate 
the Democratic insistence that new taxes be included.  Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-
AZ) also abandoned the talks.  Nevertheless, both sides agreed that the talks had made 
progress on certain spending cuts which could potentially form the basis of a long-term 
deficit reduction package.
178
   
 With the Biden talks suspended, Speaker of the House John Boehner and Obama 
began meeting in July to explore the possibility of a major deficit reduction deal that 
could be included as part of raising the debt ceiling, a so-called “grand bargain”.  
Boehner eventually backed off from the talks, which reportedly included some new 
revenues generated through tax reforms, fearing that he was risking too much political 
capital.  A second round of talks between Boehner and Obama created a framework for a 
major deal, but once again, the talks fell apart.
179
     
 Initially, it was somewhat unclear exactly why the talks between Obama and 
Boehner broke down.  Each side publicly blamed the other.  Republicans contended that 
Obama agreed upon the terms of the deal, but at the last minute insisted on including 
additional revenues, which scuttled the plan.  Democrats blamed the Tea Party, claiming 
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that Boehner folded to pressure from his far right members.  Beyond these superficial 
accounts, it was difficult to truly comprehend the course of the negotiations.    
 However, recent articles in the Washington Post and New York Times based on 
insider accounts of the negotiations provide interesting details from the negotiations.  
According to Matt Bai of the New York Times, it was Boehner who first took steps 
towards the grand bargain by indicating he was willing to include up to $800 billion in 
new revenues achieved through reform of the tax code.  Boehner’s proposal shocked the 
White House, as Republicans had adamantly resisted any measures that could possibly be 
construed as a tax increase.  The two sides attempted to negotiate based on this 
framework, but on July 9, Boehner backed out of the talks for the first time due to 
political pressure from House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) and other more hard-
line conservatives.
180
   
 But five days later, on July 14, Boehner called Obama and resurrected the talks.  
The negotiations progressed rapidly and by Sunday July 17, there was the general sense 
that a framework was in place, although certain details would still need to be hammered 
out.  Nevertheless, it appeared that despite the heightened levels of partisanship and 
divided government, the nation was actually on the verge of truly landmark legislation 
that would pave the way for a drastically improved fiscal situation.
181
  The terms of the 
deal included the $800 billion increased revenue, along with $450 billion in cuts to 
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Medicare and Medicaid, as well as a new formula for calculating Social Security 
benefits.
182
   
 However, on July 19 the dynamic on Capitol Hill changed once again when the 
Gang of Six, a bipartisan group of six Senators, released a preliminary framework for 
their deficit reduction plan.  The Gang of Six plan proposed $4.6 trillion in deficit 
reduction, including $1.2 trillion in new revenue.  Upon its announcement, Senators from 
both parties rapidly endorsed the plan, even though it was little more than a preliminary 
framework.  This development ultimately undercut the more polished negotiations 
between Obama and Boehner.  To Obama and Congressional Democrats, it appeared that 
Congressional Republicans could stomach more revenues than the $800 billion in the 
Obama-Boehner plan.
183
   
 Obama exacerbated the political impact of the Gang of Six plan by publicly 
praising it shortly after its release.  In doing so, Obama placed himself in a political 
position where agreeing to the grand bargain, with only $800 billion in revenue, would 
look like a political defeat.  The negotiations between Boehner and Obama continued 
after the release of the Gang of Six plan, but now Obama pushed Boehner to include 
more revenues.  Boehner was flummoxed by the turn of events.  He believed the two men 
had already agreed to a deal and did not take kindly to what he perceived as Obama going 
back on his word.  Consequently, the negotiations steadily deteriorated and within days 
ended for good when Boehner abandoned the talks for the second time.  Despite the 
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tremendous degree of common ground the two parties identified, there would be no grand 
bargain.
184
    
 Throughout the remainder of the summer, a number of other debt ceiling 
proposals came up for consideration, all of which either never came up for a vote, or 
failed to secure passage in both houses.  One of the more interesting proposals came from 
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell.  McConnell pitched his plan as a backup in 
the event that Congress could not secure passage of any measure to raise the debt ceiling.  
The McConnell plan would have allowed Congress to cede its debt ceiling authority to 
the President.  The President would then initiate up to three increases in the debt ceiling.  
At each increase, Congress would have the opportunity to pass a resolution of 
disapproval with a majority vote.  Obama could simply veto these resolutions, which 
would then require a two-thirds vote in each house in order to prevent the increase.  The 
prospect of a veto override would be extremely unlikely as such action would result in 
default.
185
  Another option, known as “Cap, Cut, and Balance”, passed only in the House.  
The legislation called for major spending cuts, caps on future levels of federal spending, 
and initiating the process for the passage of a balanced budget amendment to the 
constitution.  The bill had no prospects of passage in the Democratic Senate and failed.
186
  
  Lastly, Senate Majority Leader and Speaker Boehner both tried their hands at 
creating plans, but were unsuccessful.  The Reid plan packaged cuts with no new sources 
of revenue in an attempt to garner Republican support.  But Republicans contended that 
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the Reid cuts were not as large as Reid claimed and the proposal was never brought to a 
vote in the Senate.
187
  Speaker Boehner twice failed in attempts to author a plan that 
could pass through Congress.  His first attempt called for two smaller debt ceiling 
increases, coupled with spending cuts.  However, the CBO scoring of the report revealed 
that the cuts were not as deep as initially expected.  Boehner’s second plan also 
encountered turmoil, as conservative Republicans refused to endorse its initial version.  
After making alterations, Boehner succeeded in getting his bill to pass the House, but it 
failed 59-41 in the Senate.
188
   
 Finally, on August 2, with the prospect of default only hours away, President 
Obama signed a long-term debt ceiling increase into law.  The final legislation (S. 365, 
P.L. 112-25), increased the debt ceiling by $2.4 trillion, enough to prevent Congress from 
having to vote on the debt ceiling again prior to the 2012 elections.  The bill passed the 
House on August 1 by the final vote of 269-161.  House Republicans voted in favor by a 
margin of 174-66, with House Democrats split with 95 in favor and 95 opposed.  The 
next day, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 74-26.  28 Senate Republicans voted in 
favor, while 19 opposed, while the Democrats voted in favor 46-7.  The terms of the 
legislation called for $917 billion in immediate cuts to federal spending.  Additionally, a 
special joint congressional committee would be required to identify $1.5 trillion in 
additional cuts.  However, if the committee failed to do so, or if Congress failed to enact 
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the recommendations, the plan required that additional cuts take place, divided evenly 
between defense and domestic spending.
189
    
 Even though the nation avoided default, the United States still suffered 
consequences. Prior to the debt ceiling crisis, the federal government possessed a AAA 
credit rating, the highest possible ranking.  This allowed the government to borrow 
money with a low interest rate and reflected the high level of confidence investors placed 
in the government’s ability to repay debt.  About a week prior to the Obama press 
conference, on July 14, the credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s moved the federal 
government to the “CreditWatch with negative implications” list.190  Standard and Poor’s 
released a statement noting that “we believe there is an increasing risk of a substantial 
policy stalemate enduring beyond any near-term agreement to raise the debt ceiling.”191  
Essentially, Standard and Poor’s believed the partisan environment was so toxic that 
there was a significant chance the government would not raise the debt ceiling prior to 
the August second deadline.    
 On August 5, 2011, despite the successful increase in the debt ceiling, Standard 
and Poor’s dropped the federal government’s credit rating from a AAA rating to AA+, 
the first time the federal government had ever suffered a downgrade.  Once again, 
Standard and Poor’s released a statement, this time declaring that “the downgrade reflects 
our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking 
and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic 
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challenges...”192  Notably, the other two members of the so-called ‘Big Three’ credit 
rating agencies, Moody’s Investor Services and Fitch Ratings, did not downgrade the 
federal government.  Nevertheless, the symbolism behind Standard and Poor’s 
downgrade was highly apparent.  The current fiscal course of the nation was 
unsustainable and the federal government showed no signs of being able to bring the 
situation under control.    
Conclusions  
 The 2011 crisis presents another instance in which a divided Congress with 
Republicans in control of the House exacerbated debt ceiling crisis.  There was no 
incentive for House Republicans to raise the debt ceiling in a harmonious manner as 
doing so would have likely strengthened President Obama and the Democratic Party’s 
electoral position.  Instead, it was in the House Republicans’ best interests to delay the 
negotiations and force the inclusion of key deficit reduction measures.  However, House 
Republicans were forced to walk a fine line between driving a hard bargain for a deficit 
reduction package and being downright obstructionist.  As previously discussed, the 
public often holds the president responsible for raising the debt ceiling, but our 1995 case 
illustrates that blame can also fall to Congress if the public determines that the Congress 
was being too radical in their demands. 
 The most unique aspect of the 2011 crisis was the Tea Party.  The normal debt 
ceiling negotiations under divided government involve a game of political chicken where 
                                                             
192
 “United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered to ‘AA+’ Due to Political Risks, Rising Debt 
Burden,; Outlook Negative,” Standard and Poor’s, August 5, 2011, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563 (accessed April 12, 
2012). 
D’Alessio 63 
 
each side maintains their demands until the last possible moment before making enough 
concessions to pass the necessary increase.  Both sides ultimately recognize that default is 
unacceptable and at some point, they will need to make concessions to ensure default 
does not take place.   However, the Tea Party bucked the traditional dynamic because 
many members expressed no qualms with the potential for default.  Thus, Tea Party 
members operated under a completely different set of assumptions than the rest of 
Congress.  Default was not ideal, but if significant concessions did not take place, it 
would be an acceptable option.  The Tea Party’s willingness to default marks the most 
difference between the 2011 crisis and the 1995 crisis, which otherwise proves highly 
similar.  During the Clinton vs. Gingrich standoff, there was the definite sense that 
Congressional Republicans were bluffing and would back down and raise the debt ceiling 
when the time came.  This was not the case in 2011.
193
   
 It is impossible to know whether the Tea Party position was a truly a bluff.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that this radical stance helped Republicans dictate the terms of 
the increase.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the fact that the final deal did not 
include any taxes.  However, the Tea Party position also contributed to the perception 
that Republicans were sticking to unrealistic demands and being reckless.  This allowed 
Democrats to gain a number of concessions, including the requirement that the 
government would be prevented voting on the debt ceiling again before the 2012 
elections.  In the end, the final deal, actually exhibited some signs of a bipartisan 
compromise.    
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 It is also interesting to examine the insights provided by the recent Washington 
Post and New York Times articles.  Both articles illustrate the tremendous role that 
personal relationships played in debt ceiling negotiations.  Boehner and his staff 
vehemently disliked Obama’s budget director, Jack Lew.  They concluded that Lew was 
not willing to offer the type of concessions that would be necessary to reach any sort of 
far-reaching deal.  As a result, Boehner and his aides insisted on meeting with Bill Daley, 
Obama’s chief of staff and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner during the opening salvo of 
talks on the grand bargain.  This particular group of individuals worked well together and 
put the initial framework in place for the grand bargain.
194
      
 The relationship between Boehner and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor also 
played a pivotal role in the negotiations.  Many have suspected that Cantor has designs on 
the Speakership, even if that means usurping the position from Boehner.  Accordingly, 
the two men have a somewhat strained relationship, although both men have downplayed 
any tensions.  Cantor has branded himself as the more conservative of the pair and 
aligned himself closely with the Tea Party, while Boehner’s position as Speaker requires 
him to maintain strong relationships with the entirety of his caucus.  Cantor’s political 
ambitions were evident in the fact that he never truly endorsed the idea of the grand 
bargain.  Instead, he preferred a smaller increase, likely reasoning that any major deal 
would only enhance President Obama’s chances in the 2012 elections.  Once Obama 
requested more revenues, Cantor saw his opportunity to crush the deal and took it, 
encouraging Boehner to abandon the talks.  In a fateful July 21 meeting between the two 
men, Boehner floated the idea of potentially continuing the negotiations with Obama, but 
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Cantor dissuaded him from this option.  Without Cantor’s support, Boehner recognized 
that if he went out on a limb and continued the negotiations, Cantor’s more conservative 
stance would ultimately undercut any actions he took.
195
   
 Additionally, both articles make clear just how close the two sides really were to 
what would have been a truly incredible compromise.  Despite divided government and 
heightened partisanship, there evidently was a moment in which both parties believed 
they had reached agreement on a truly monumental and far-reaching agreement that 
would cut spending, reform the tax code, and set entitlement spending on a more 
sustainable course.  However, the tremendously sensitive nature of the political 
discussions meant that utmost secrecy was of paramount importance.  Consequently, the 
Gang of Six members were not aware that the timing of their plan’s release was 
tremendously inopportune and inadvertently started the spiral of events that destroyed the 
potential for the deal.
196
   
 On the surface, Obama’s decision to praise the Gang of Six plan appears 
somewhat perplexing.  However, Bai concludes that Obama’s decision reflects his 
insatiable desire to achieve the type of bipartisan compromise he had promised during his 
campaign.  Ultimately Obama overreacted to the Gang of Six plan and neglected to really 
consider the fact that the deal was not fully formed and would be virtually impossible to 
navigate through the House of Representatives given the revenues included.  His decision 
became a significant miscalculation, one that some insider sources in the Republican 
Party attributed to Obama’s significant lack of legislative experience.  Ultimately, the 
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miscalculation scuttled the best hopes for a grand bargain and a far-reaching deficit 
reduction deal.
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Section 4: Conclusions 
 Debt ceiling votes since the 1950s have proven highly contentious, punctuated by 
instances of full blown crisis where default appeared a distinct possibility.  Thus, the idea 
that the summer of 2011 was the first significant debt ceiling crisis proves completely 
inaccurate.  Periodic debt ceiling crises result from two significant post-1950s trends in 
American politics: increased national debt and divided government.  In the face of 
growing debt, members have attempted to use to use the debt ceiling to check executive 
borrowing, including attaching deficit reduction plans directly to debt ceiling increases.  
This practice adds an extra layer to already challenging negotiations and has directly 
precipitated a number of crises since 1980.  Additionally, debt ceiling crises are the 
product of more frequent periods of divided government.  Divided government requires 
compromise in order to increase the debt ceiling, but member incentives under divided 
government discourage compromise.  Further, heightened levels of partisanship have 
made forging compromises under divided government even more difficult.   
Research Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research  
 The research methods employed in this paper were almost exclusively qualitative, 
rather than quantitative.  This was one of the project’s chief limitations.  Further research 
would most certainly benefit from a more quantitative design as such methods could 
more clearly distinguish the impact of increased debt and divided government on debt 
ceiling crises.  Additionally, initial research designs for this project called for interviews 
with Congressional staffers involved in past debt ceiling crises.  These interviews would 
have provided an invaluable insider perspective into the deliberations during crises, just 
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as interview research did for the pieces in the New York Times and Washington Post.  
Unfortunately, I did not conduct any interviews.  Further efforts to examine debt ceiling 
crises would benefit from interview research. 
    Another interesting avenue for additional debt ceiling research would be to 
incorporate public opinion data into the research design.  It would be interesting to 
determine the public’s awareness of the debt ceiling and how members’ knowledge of 
public awareness affects their decision-making.  I would guess that heightened public 
awareness of the national debt and debt ceiling would ultimately coincide with greater 
instances of debt ceiling crisis, although until we examine real data, it is impossible to be 
sure.  During my research, I considered including some public opinion data, but found it 
more difficult to find than I anticipated.  For instance, the Policy Agenda Project had no 
data on the national debt, much less the debt ceiling.  Nevertheless, it would seem that it 
would not be too difficult to find the necessary data and if the data really did not exist, it 
would be well worth compiling.   
Final Thoughts   
 There is no reason to believe that the root causes of debt ceiling crisis will 
suddenly disappear from the political landscape.  Accordingly, we can expect that debt 
ceiling crises will continue to take place periodically throughout the near future.  
However, some scholars believe the importance of the debt ceiling is overemphasized.  
Anita S. Krishnakumar writes that, “little to no harm actually has come to the nation’s 
credit or financial standing even during the limited periods in history when congressional 
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foot-dragging has raised the spectre of government default.”198  Further, the myriad of 
special maneuvers available to the Treasury Department, make complete default a virtual 
impossibility.
199
     
   On the one hand, Krishnakumar makes a very significant point.  The possibility of 
complete default is indeed incredibly small.  Even with a significant portion of the House 
of Representatives expressing no qualms with default during the summer of 2011, default 
did not take place.  Nevertheless, the summer of 2011 pokes a number of holes in 
Krishnakumar’s argument.  As a result of the United States’ near default, Standard and 
Poor’s downgraded the nation’s credit rating for the first time ever, a significant symbolic 
blow.  Accordingly, we see that even if complete default is unlikely, many of the lesser 
consequences of default can still take place.  Thus, it would be foolish to undervalue the 
importance of the debt ceiling.   
 Others take the opposite extreme position from Krishnakumar.  These individuals 
contend that the debt ceiling is so significant a threat to the nation’s well being that it 
must be repealed.  For instance, at the height of the debt ceiling crisis of 2011, Former 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin who managed the earlier debt ceiling crisis in 1995, 
referred to the debt ceiling as an “anachronism” and suggested that it should not be used 
as a means to control government spending because it is too dangerous.  According to 
Rubin, negotiations to reduce the debt should not take place under the threat of default.
200
  
This point of view also has its merits.  Ideally, members would find ways to check 
                                                             
198
 Krishnakumar, 176. 
199
 Ibid. 
200
 “Debt Ceiling’s History Lessons,” uploaded to YouTube by CNNMoney on April 25, 2011, CNN, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUOopTYJ-8E (accessed April 12, 2012). 
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government spending that did not involve placing the nation’s viability at risk.  However, 
no such check has proven effective.   
 As the national debt has reached unprecedented levels over the last half century, 
the need for drastic policy change has become increasingly clear.  Nevertheless, 
legislators have consistently proven either incapable or simply unwilling to confront the 
national debt.  Further, while the debt ceiling has not proven particularly useful in 
reducing the debt, at the very least, it forces members to confront the debt and creates the 
conditions that could potentially lead to a major debt reduction deal.  This is best 
illustrated in the summer of 2011 where the debt ceiling very nearly became the impetus 
for the grand bargain, what would have been a truly remarkable legislative 
accomplishment.  Thus, given our fiscal situation and the difficulties of the current 
political environment, the debt ceiling may actually be the best hope for debt reduction.   
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Section 5: Charts/Data 
Table 1.  House Votes Related to the Debt Limit, 1953-2008 
 
Congress Bipartisan Partisan Total 
    
83 *0 2 2 
 **0 100 100 
    
84 1 0 1 
 100 0 100 
    
85 3 0 3 
 100 0 100 
    
86 2 1 3 
 66.67 33.33 100 
    
87 0 5 5 
 0 100 100 
    
88 1 8 9 
 11.11 88.89 100 
    
89 0 4 4 
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 0 100 100 
    
90 2 6 8 
 25 75 100 
    
91 3 0 3 
 100 0 100 
    
92 7 5 12 
 58.33 41.67 100 
    
93 7 6 13 
 53.85 46.15 100 
    
94 6 9 15 
 40 60 100 
    
95 4 11 15 
 26.67 73.33 100 
    
96 4 14 18 
 22.22 77.78 100 
    
97 2 0 2 
 100 0 100 
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98 4 5 9 
 44.44 55.56 100 
    
99 5 9 14 
 35.71 64.29 100 
    
100 2 5 7 
 28.57 71.43 100 
    
101 1 7 8 
 12.5 87.5 100 
    
103 0 4 4 
 0 100 100 
    
104 3 19 22 
 13.64 86.36 100 
    
106 3 0 3 
 100 0 100 
    
107 0 2 2 
 0 100 100 
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108 0 3 3 
 0 100 100 
    
Total 60 125 185 
 32.43 67.57 100 
 
* Number of votes 
** Percentage of votes 
 
Note:  Votes are denoted as partisan if a majority of one party voted differently from a 
majority of the other.  Votes are denoted as bipartisan if a majority of one party did not 
vote differently from a majority of the other.  The right-most column is the total number 
of debt limit related votes per two-year congress. 
Source: Rohde, David W. Roll Call Voting Data for the United States House of 
Representatives, 1953-2008. Compiled by the Political Institutions and Public Choice 
Program, Duke University. 
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Table 2: Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of  
GDP: 1930-2011  
 
Year GDP (in billions of dollars) 
Total 
Receipts 
(% GDP) 
Outlays 
(% 
GDP) 
Surplus or 
Deficit (–) 
(%GDP) 
1930 97.4 4.2 3.4 0.8 
1931 83.9 3.7 4.3 -0.6 
1932 67.6 2.8 6.9 -4.0 
1933 57.6 3.5 8.0 -4.5 
1934 61.2 4.8 10.7 -5.9 
1935 69.6 5.2 9.2 -4.0 
1936 78.5 5.0 10.5 -5.5 
1937 87.8 6.1 8.6 -2.5 
1938 89.0 7.6 7.7 -0.1 
1939 89.1 7.1 10.3 -3.2 
1940 96.8 6.8 9.8 -3.0 
1941 114.1 7.6 12.0 -4.3 
1942 144.3 10.1 24.3 -14.2 
1943 180.3 13.3 43.6 -30.3 
1944 209.2 20.9 43.6 -22.7 
1945 221.4 20.4 41.9 -21.5 
1946 222.6 17.7 24.8 -7.2 
1947 233.2 16.5 14.8 1.7 
1948 256.6 16.2 11.6 4.6 
1949 271.3 14.5 14.3 0.2 
1950 273.1 14.4 15.6 -1.1 
1951 320.2 16.1 14.2 1.9 
1952 348.7 19.0 19.4 -0.4 
1953 372.5 18.7 20.4 -1.7 
1954 377.0 18.5 18.8 -0.3 
1955 395.9 16.5 17.3 -0.8 
1956 427.0 17.5 16.5 0.9 
1957 450.9 17.7 17.0 0.8 
1958 460.0 17.3 17.9 -0.6 
1959 490.2 16.2 18.8 -2.6 
1960 518.9 17.8 17.8 0.1 
1961 529.9 17.8 18.4 -0.6 
1962 567.8 17.6 18.8 -1.3 
1963 599.2 17.8 18.6 -0.8 
1964 641.5 17.6 18.5 -0.9 
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1965 687.5 17.0 17.2 -0.2 
1966 755.8 17.3 17.8 -0.5 
1967 810.0 18.4 19.4 -1.1 
1968 868.4 17.6 20.5 -2.9 
1969 948.1 19.7 19.4 0.3 
1970 1,012.7 19.0 19.3 -0.3 
1971 1,080.0 17.3 19.5 -2.1 
1972 1,176.5 17.6 19.6 -2.0 
1973 1,310.6 17.6 18.7 -1.1 
1974 1,438.5 18.3 18.7 -0.4 
1975 1,560.2 17.9 21.3 -3.4 
1976 1,738.1 17.1 21.4 -4.2 
TQ 459.4 17.7 20.9 -3.2 
1977 1,973.5 18.0 20.7 -2.7 
1978 2,217.5 18.0 20.7 -2.7 
1979 2,501.4 18.5 20.1 -1.6 
1980 2,724.2 19.0 21.7 -2.7 
1981 3,057.0 19.6 22.2 -2.6 
1982 3,223.7 19.2 23.1 -4.0 
1983 3,440.7 17.5 23.5 -6.0 
1984 3,844.4 17.3 22.2 -4.8 
1985 4,146.3 17.7 22.8 -5.1 
1986 4,403.9 17.5 22.5 -5.0 
1987 4,651.4 18.4 21.6 -3.2 
1988 5,008.5 18.2 21.3 -3.1 
1989 5,399.5 18.4 21.2 -2.8 
1990 5,734.5 18.0 21.9 -3.9 
1991 5,930.5 17.8 22.3 -4.5 
1992 6,242.0 17.5 22.1 -4.7 
1993 6,587.3 17.5 21.4 -3.9 
1994 6,976.6 18.0 21.0 -2.9 
1995 7,341.1 18.4 20.6 -2.2 
1996 7,718.3 18.8 20.2 -1.4 
1997 8,211.7 19.2 19.5 -0.3 
1998 8,663.0 19.9 19.1 0.8 
1999 9,208.4 19.8 18.5 1.4 
2000 9,821.0 20.6 18.2 2.4 
2001 10,225.3 19.5 18.2 1.3 
2002 10,543.9 17.6 19.1 -1.5 
2003 10,980.2 16.2 19.7 -3.4 
2004 11,676.0 16.1 19.6 -3.5 
2005 12,428.6 17.3 19.9 -2.6 
2006 13,206.5 18.2 20.1 -1.9 
2007 13,861.4 18.5 19.7 -1.2 
2008 14,334.4 17.6 20.8 -3.2 
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2009 13,937.5 15.1 25.2 -10.1 
2010 14,359.7 15.1 24.1 -9.0 
2011 14,958.6 15.4 24.1 -8.7 
 
Source: Data adapted from Office of Management and Budget. Historical Tables. “Table 
1.1—Summary f Receipts, Outlays, Surpluses or Deficits (-): 1789-2017.” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D’Alessio 92 
 
Table 3: Summary of Receipts, Outlaws, and Surpluses or Deficits (-): 1789-2011 
Year 
Total (Millions of Dollars) 
Receipts Outlays 
Surplus or Deficit 
(–) 
1789–1849 1,160 1,090 70 
1850–1900 14,462 15,453 -991 
1901 588 525 63 
1902 562 485 77 
1903 562 517 45 
1904 541 584 -43 
1905 544 567 -23 
1906 595 570 25 
1907 666 579 87 
1908 602 659 -57 
1909 604 694 -89 
1910 676 694 -18 
1911 702 691 11 
1912 693 690 3 
1913 714 715 −* 
1914 725 726 −* 
1915 683 746 -63 
1916 761 713 48 
1917 1,101 1,954 -853 
1918 3,645 12,677 -9,032 
1919 5,130 18,493 -13,363 
1920 6,649 6,358 291 
1921 5,571 5,062 509 
1922 4,026 3,289 736 
1923 3,853 3,140 713 
1924 3,871 2,908 963 
1925 3,641 2,924 717 
1926 3,795 2,930 865 
1927 4,013 2,857 1,155 
1928 3,900 2,961 939 
1929 3,862 3,127 734 
1930 4,058 3,320 738 
1931 3,116 3,577 -462 
1932 1,924 4,659 -2,735 
1933 1,997 4,598 -2,602 
1934 2,955 6,541 -3,586 
1935 3,609 6,412 -2,803 
1936 3,923 8,228 -4,304 
1937 5,387 7,580 -2,193 
1938 6,751 6,840 -89 
1939 6,295 9,141 -2,846 
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1940 6,548 9,468 -2,920 
1941 8,712 13,653 -4,941 
1942 14,634 35,137 -20,503 
1943 24,001 78,555 -54,554 
1944 43,747 91,304 -47,557 
1945 45,159 92,712 -47,553 
1946 39,296 55,232 -15,936 
1947 38,514 34,496 4,018 
1948 41,560 29,764 11,796 
1949 39,415 38,835 580 
1950 39,443 42,562 -3,119 
1951 51,616 45,514 6,102 
1952 66,167 67,686 -1,519 
1953 69,608 76,101 -6,493 
1954 69,701 70,855 -1,154 
1955 65,451 68,444 -2,993 
1956 74,587 70,640 3,947 
1957 79,990 76,578 3,412 
1958 79,636 82,405 -2,769 
1959 79,249 92,098 -12,849 
1960 92,492 92,191 301 
1961 94,388 97,723 -3,335 
1962 99,676 106,821 -7,146 
1963 106,560 111,316 -4,756 
1964 112,613 118,528 -5,915 
1965 116,817 118,228 -1,411 
1966 130,835 134,532 -3,698 
1967 148,822 157,464 -8,643 
1968 152,973 178,134 -25,161 
1969 186,882 183,640 3,242 
1970 192,807 195,649 -2,842 
1971 187,139 210,172 -23,033 
1972 207,309 230,681 -23,373 
1973 230,799 245,707 -14,908 
1974 263,224 269,359 -6,135 
1975 279,090 332,332 -53,242 
1976 298,060 371,792 -73,732 
TQ 81,232 95,975 -14,744 
1977 355,559 409,218 -53,659 
1978 399,561 458,746 -59,185 
1979 463,302 504,028 -40,726 
1980 517,112 590,941 -73,830 
1981 599,272 678,241 -78,968 
1982 617,766 745,743 -127,977 
1983 600,562 808,364 -207,802 
1984 666,438 851,805 -185,367 
D’Alessio 94 
 
1985 734,037 946,344 -212,308 
1986 769,155 990,382 -221,227 
1987 854,288 1,004,017 -149,730 
1988 909,238 1,064,416 -155,178 
1989 991,105 1,143,744 -152,639 
1990 1,031,958 1,252,994 -221,036 
1991 1,054,988 1,324,226 -269,238 
1992 1,091,208 1,381,529 -290,321 
1993 1,154,335 1,409,386 -255,051 
1994 1,258,566 1,461,753 -203,186 
1995 1,351,790 1,515,742 -163,952 
1996 1,453,053 1,560,484 -107,431 
1997 1,579,232 1,601,116 -21,884 
1998 1,721,728 1,652,458 69,270 
1999 1,827,452 1,701,842 125,610 
2000 2,025,191 1,788,950 236,241 
2001 1,991,082 1,862,846 128,236 
2002 1,853,136 2,010,894 -157,758 
2003 1,782,314 2,159,899 -377,585 
2004 1,880,114 2,292,841 -412,727 
2005 2,153,611 2,471,957 -318,346 
2006 2,406,869 2,655,050 -248,181 
2007 2,567,985 2,728,686 -160,701 
2008 2,523,991 2,982,544 -458,553 
2009 2,104,989 3,517,677 -1,412,688 
2010 2,162,724 3,456,213 -1,293,489 
2011 2,303,466 3,603,061 -1,299,595 
     
Source: Data adapted from Office of Management and Budget.  Historical Tables “Table 
1.2—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages 
of GDP: 1930–2017.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. 
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Table 4: Federal Debt at End of Fiscal Year, 1940-2011 
End of Fiscal 
Year  
Gross Federal 
Debt (Millions of 
Dollars) Gross Federal Debt as Percent of GDP 
1940 50,696 52.4 
1941 57,531 50.4 
1942 79,200 54.9 
1943 142,648 79.1 
1944 204,079 97.6 
1945 260,123 117.5 
1946 270,991 121.7 
1947 257,149 110.3 
1948 252,031 98.2 
1949 252,610 93.1 
1950 256,853 94.1 
1951 255,288 79.7 
1952 259,097 74.3 
1953 265,963 71.4 
1954 270,812 71.8 
1955 274,366 69.3 
1956 272,693 63.9 
1957 272,252 60.4 
1958 279,666 60.8 
1959 287,465 58.6 
1960 290,525 56.0 
1961 292,648 55.2 
1962 302,928 53.4 
1963 310,324 51.8 
1964 316,059 49.3 
1965 322,318 46.9 
1966 328,498 43.5 
1967 340,445 42.0 
1968 368,685 42.5 
1969 365,769 38.6 
1970 380,921 37.6 
1971 408,176 37.8 
1972 435,936 37.1 
1973 466,291 35.6 
1974 483,893 33.6 
1975 541,925 34.7 
1976 628,970 36.2 
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TQ 643,561 35.0 
1977 706,398 35.8 
1978 776,602 35.0 
1979 829,467 33.2 
1980 909,041 33.4 
1981 994,828 32.5 
1982 1,137,315 35.3 
1983 1,371,660 39.9 
1984 1,564,586 40.7 
1985 1,817,423 43.8 
1986 2,120,501 48.2 
1987 2,345,956 50.4 
1988 2,601,104 51.9 
1989 2,867,800 53.1 
1990 3,206,290 55.9 
1991 3,598,178 60.7 
1992 4,001,787 64.1 
1993 4,351,044 66.1 
1994 4,643,307 66.6 
1995 4,920,586 67.0 
1996 5,181,465 67.1 
1997 5,369,206 65.4 
1998 5,478,189 63.2 
1999 5,605,523 60.9 
2000 5,628,700 57.3 
2001 5,769,881 56.4 
2002 6,198,401 58.8 
2003 6,760,014 61.6 
2004 7,354,657 63.0 
2005 7,905,300 63.6 
2006 8,451,350 64.0 
2007 8,950,744 64.6 
2008 9,986,082 69.7 
2009 11,875,851 85.2 
2010 13,528,807 94.2 
2011 14,764,222 98.7 
 
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables. “Table 7.1: Federal Debt 
at the End of Year: 1940-2017.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. 
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Table 5: House Roll Call Votes on Enacted Measures to Adjust the Federal Debt Limit, 
1950-Present 
DATE  LEG #  VOTE REPUB DEM RELATED P.L. 
      31-Jul-53 H.R. 6672 239-158 169-33 69-125 P.L. 83-686(August 28, 1954) 
      27-Jun-55 H.R. 6992 267-56 133-13 134-43 P.L. 84-124 (June 30, 1955) 
      21-Jun-56 H.R. 11740 VV VV VV P.L. 84-678 (July 9, 1956) 
      23-Jan-58 H.R. 9955 328-71 142-42 186-29 P.L. 85-336 (February 26, 1958) 
 
6-Aug-58 H.R. 13580 286-109 120-65 166-44 P.L. 85-912 (September 2, 1958) 
      19-Jun-59 H.R. 7749 256-117 88-48 168-69 P.L.  86-74 (June 30, 1959) 
      
8-Jun-60 H.R. 12381 223-174 83-60 
140-
114 P.L. 86-564 (June 30, 1960) 
      26-Jun-61 H.R. 7677 231-148 40-113 191-35 P.L. 87-69 (June 30, 1961) 
      20-Feb-62 H.R. 10050 251-144 60-98 191-46 P.L. 87-414 (March 13, 1962) 
 
14-Jun-62 H.R. 11990 211-192 9-153 202-39 P.L. 87-512 (July 1, 1962) 
      15-May-63 H.R. 6009 213-204 1-172 212-32 P.L. 88-30 (May 29, 1963) 
 
8-Aug-63 H.R. 7824 229-165 2-158 219-17 P.L. 88-106  (August 27, 1963) 
 
7-Nov-63 H.R. 8969 187-179 0-147 187-32 P.L. 88-187 (November 26, 1963) 
      18-Jun-64 H.R. 11375 203-182 0-154 203-58 P.L. 88-327 (June 29, 1964) 
      9-Jun-65 H.R. 8464 229-165 6-122 223-43 P.L. 89-49  (June 24, 1965) 
      8-Jun-66 H.R. 15202 199-165 1-121 198-44 P.L. 99-484 (June 30, 1966) 
      8-Feb-67 H.R. 4573 215-199 2-173 213-26 P.L. 90-3 (March 2, 1967) 
 
8-Feb-67 H.R. 10867 217-196 0-176 217-20 P.L. 90-39 (June 30,1967) 
      25-Mar-69 H.R. 8508 313-93 140-41 173-52 P.L. 91-8 (April 8, 1969) 
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3-Jun-70 H.R. 17802 236-127 107-59 129-68 P.L. 91-301 (June 30, 1970) 
      
3-Mar-71 H.R. 4960 228-162 105-62 
123-
100 P.L. 92-5 (March 17, 1971) 
      9-Feb-72 H.R. 12910 247-147 92-69 155-78 P.L. 92-250 (March 15, 1972) 
 
 
27-Jun-72 H.R. 15390 211-168 98-59 
113-
109 P.L. 92-336 (July 1, 1972) 
 
10-Oct-72 H.R. 16810 221-163 141-21 80-142 P.L. 92-599 (October 27, 1972) 
      13-Jun-73 H.R. 8410 261-152 127-55 134-97 P.L. 93-53 (July 1, 1973) 
 
7-Nov-73 H.R. 11104 253-153 93-88 160-65 P.L. 93-173 (December 3, 1973) 
      23-May-74 H.R. 14832 191-190 75-93 116-97 P.L. 93-325 (June 30, 1974) 
      5-Feb-75 H.R. 2634 248-170 62-76 186-94 P.L. 94-3 (February 19, 1975) 
 
 
24-Jun-75 H.R. 8030 223-196 60-81 
163-
115 P.L. 94-47 (June 30, 1975) 
 
13-Nov-75 H.R. 10585 213-198 13-122 200-76 P.L. 94-132 (November 14, 1975) 
      25-Feb-76 H.R. 11893 212-189 46-92 166-97 P.L. 94-232 (March 15, 1976) 
 
14-Jun-76 H.R. 14114 184-177 37-85 147-92 P.L. 94-334 (June 30, 1976) 
      28-Sep-77 H.R. 9290 213-202 19-121 194-81 P.L. 95-120 (October 4, 1977) 
      21-Mar-78 H.R. 11518 233-172 27-113 206-59 P.L. 95-252 (March 27, 1978) 
 
19-Jul-78 H.R. 13385 205-202 9-128 196-74 P.L. 95-333 (August 3, 1978) 
      15-Mar-79 H.R. 2534 209-165 6-128 203-37 P.L. 96-5 (April 2, 1979) 
 
26-Sep-79 H.R. 5369 219-198 5-146 214-52 P.L. 96-78 (September 29, 1979) 
      30-May-80 H.R. 7471 VV VV VV P.L. 96-256 (May 30, 1980) 
 
5-Jun-80 H.R. 7428 335-34 142-0 193-34 P.L. 96-264 (June 6, 1980) 
 
 
13-Jun-80 
H.J. Res 
569 GR GR GR P.L. 96-286(June 28, 1980) 
 
 
13-Jun-80 
H.R. Res 
570 GR GR GR P.L. 96-556 (December 19, 1980) 
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5-Feb-81 H.R. 1553 305-104 150-36 155-68 P.L. 97-2 (February 7, 1981) 
 
 
21-May-81 
 
H.J. Res 
266 
 
GR 
 
GR 
 
GR 
 
P.L. 97-48 (September 30, 1981) 
 
 
21-May-81 
H.J. Res 
265 GR GR GR P.L. 97-49 (September 30, 1981) 
      
23-Jun-82 
H.J. Res 
519 GR GR GR P.L. 97-204  (June 28, 1982) 
 
 
23-Jun-82 
H.J. Res 
520 GR GR GR P.L. 97-270 (September 30, 1982) 
      18-May-83 H.R. 2990 VV VV VV P.L. 98-34 (May 26, 1983) 
 
 
18-Nov-83 
H.J. Res 
308 214-186 60-92 154-94 P.L. 98-161 (November 21, 1983) 
      
24-May-84 H.R. 5692 211-198 69-90 
142-
108 P.L. 98-302 (May 25, 1984) 
 
 
28-Jun-84 H.R. 5953 208-202 84-72 
124-
130 P.L. 98-342 (July 6, 1984) 
      
1-Oct-84 
H. J. Res 
654 UC UC UC P.L. 98-475 (October 13, 1984) 
      13-Nov-85 H.R. 3721 300-121 88-90 212-31 P.L. 99-155 (November 14, 1985) 
 
 
12-Dec-85 
H.J. Res 
372 271-154 153-24 
118-
130 P.L. 99-177(December 12, 1985) 
      14-Aug-86 H.R. 5395 216-199 19-155 197-44 P.L. 99-384 (August 21, 1986) 
 
17-Oct-86 H.R. 5300 305-70 112-51 193-19 P.L. 99-509 (October 21, 1986) 
      13-May-87 H.R. 2360 296-124 77-96 219-28 P.L. 100-40 (May 15, 1987) 
 
28-Jul-87 H.R. 3022 263-155 41-134 221-21 P.L. 100-80 (July 30, 1987) 
 
7-Aug-87 H.R. 3190 VV VV VV P.L. 100-84 (August 10, 1987) 
 
 
22-Sep-87 
H.J. Res 
324  230-176 105-65 
125-
111 P.L. 100-119 (September 29, 1987) 
      1-Aug-89 H.R. 3024 231-185 50-122 181-63 P.L. 101-72 (Aug. 7, 1989) 
 
 
7-Nov-89 
H.J. Res 
280 269-99 93-65 176-34 P.L. 101-140 (November 8, 1989) 
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3-Aug-90 H.R. 5350 247-172 46-126 201-46 P.L. 101-350 (August 9, 1990) 
 
30-Sep-90 
 
H.R. 5755 
 
VV 
 
VV 
 
VV 
 
P.L. 101-405 (October 2, 1990) 
 
 
9-Oct-90 
 
H.J. Res 
666 
 
362-3 
 
156-2 
 
206-1 
 
P.L. 101-412 (October 9, 1990) 
 
 
18-Oct-90 
H.J .Res 
677 379-37 138-32 241-5 P.L. 101-444  (October 19, 1990) 
 
 
24-Oct-90 
H.J. Res 
681 380-45 136-38 244-7 P.L. 101-461(October 25, 1990) 
 
 
27-Oct-90 
 
H.J. Res 
687 
 
283-49 
 
97-45 
 
186-4 P.L. 101-467 (October 28, 1990) 
 
26-Oct-90 H.R. 5835 228-200 47-126 181-74 P.L. 101-508 (November 5, 1990) 
      2-Apr-93 H.R. 1430 237-177 2-165 234-12 P.L. 103-12 (April 6, 1993) 
 
5-Aug-93 H.R. 2264 218-216 0-175 217-41 P.L. 103-66 (August 10, 1993) 
      1-Feb-96 H.R. 2924 396-0 217-0 179-0 P.L. 104-103 (February 8, 1996) 
 
7-Mar-96 H.R. 3021 362-51 183-45 178-6 P.L. 104-115 (March 12, 1996) 
 
28-Mar-96 H.R. 3136 328-91 201-30 127-60 P.L. 104-121 (March 29, 1996 
      5-Aug-97 H.R. 2015 346-85 193-32 153-52 P.L. 105-33  (August 5, 1997) 
      27-Jun-02 S. 2578 215-214 212-6 3-206 P.L. 107-199 (June 28, 2002) 
      11-Apr-03 H.J. Res 51 216-211  216-7 0-203 P.L. 108-24 (May 27, 2003) 
  
(H. Con. Res. 
95) 
   
      18-Nov-04 S. 2986 208-204 208-10 0-193 P.L. 108-415 (November 19, 2004) 
      28-Apr-05 H.J. Res 47 GR GR GR P.L. 109-182 (March 20, 2006) 
      17-May-07 H. J. Res 43 GR GR GR P.L. 110-91 (September 29, 2007) 
      23-Jul-08 H.R. 3221 272-152 45-149 227-3 P.L. 110-289 (July 30, 2008) 
 
3-Oct-08 H.R. 1424  263-171 91-108 172-63 P.L. 110-343 (October 3, 2008) 
      13-Feb-09 H.R. 1 246-183 0-176 246-7 P.L. 111-5 (February 17, 2009) 
 
16-Dec-09 H.R. 4314 218-214 0-175 218-39 P.L. 111-123 (December 28, 2009) 
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      4-Feb-10 H.J. Res 45 233-187 0-172 233-15 P.L. 111-139 (February 12, 2010) 
      1-Aug-11 S. 365 269-161 174-66 95-95 P.L. 112-25 (August 2, 2011) 
 
VV= Voice Vote                    UC= Unanimous Consent    GR= Gephardt Rule (all italics) 
Source: CQ Almanac and Justin Murray, “Votes on Measures to Adjust the Statutory 
Debt Limit, 1978 to Present,” Congressional Research Service. (August 9, 2011). 
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Table 6: Senate Roll Call Votes on Enacted Measures to Adjust the Federal Debt Limit, 
1950-Present 
DATE LEG # VOTE REPUBs  DEMs RELATED P.L. 
      13-Aug-
54 H.R. 6672 VV VV VV P.L. (August 28, 1954) 
      3-Jun-55 H.R. 6992 VV VV VV P.L. 84-124 (June 30, 1955) 
      July 
3,1956 H.R. 11740 VV VV VV P.L. 84-678 (July 9, 1956) 
      24-Feb-
58 H.R. 9955 VV VV VV P.L. 336 (February 26, 1958) 
 
22-Aug-
58 H.R. 13580 57-20 29-7 42-5 P.L. 912 (September 2, 1958) 
      25-Jun-
59 H.R. 7749 VV VV VV  P.L.  86-74 (June 30, 1959) 
      20-Jun-
60 H.R. 12381 84-0 51-0 33-0 P.L. 86-564 (June 30, 1960) 
      28-Jun-
61 H.R. 7677 VV VV VV  P.L. 87-69 (June 30, 1961) 
      1-Mar-62 H.R. 10050 VV VV VV P.L. 87-414 (March 13, 1962) 
 
28-Jun-
62 H.R. 11990 55-34 12-20  43-14 P.L. 87-512 (July 1, 1962) 
      28-May-
63 H.R. 6009 60-24 15-13 45-11 P.L. 88-30 (May 29, 1963) 
 
20-Aug-
63 H.R. 7824 57-31 12-19  45-12 P.L. 88-106  (August 27, 1963) 
 
21-Nov-
63 H.R. 8969 50-26 11-13  39-13 P.L. 88-187 (November 26, 1963) 
      26-Jun-
64 H.R. 11375 48-21 12-12  36-9 P.L. 88-327 (June 29, 1964) 
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16-Jun-
65 
H.R. 8464 61-26 12-16 49-10 P.L. 89-49  (June 24, 1965) 
      16-Jun-
66 H.R. 15202 50-17 10-9  40-8 P.L. 99-484 (June 30, 1966) 
      21-Feb-
67 H.R. 4573 54-23 12-12 42-11 P.L. 90-3 (March 2, 1967) 
 
27-Jun-
67 H.R. 10867 60-30- 15-15 45-15 P.L. 90-39 (June 30,1967) 
      27-Mar-
69 H.R. 8508 67-18 31-4 36-14 P.L. 91-8 (April 8, 1969) 
      29-Jun-
70 H.R. 17802 64-19 31-7 33-12 P.L. 91-301 (June 30, 1970) 
      12-Mar-
71 H.R. 4690 80-0 37-0 43-0 P.L. 92-5 (March 17, 1971) 
      8-Mar-72 H.R. 12910 53-29 28-12 25-17 P.L. 92-250 (March 15, 1972) 
 
30-Jun-
72 H.R. 15390 78-3 36-1 42-2 P.L. 92-336 (July 1, 1972) 
 
13-Oct-
72 H.R. 16810 61-11 28-3 33-8 P.L. 92-599 (October 27, 1972) 
      27-Jun-
73 HR 8410 72-19 24-16 48-3 P.L. 95-53 (July 1, 1973) 
 
27-Nov-
73 HR 11104 58-34 14-24 44-10 P.L. 93-173 (December 3, 1973) 
      26-Jun-
74 H.R. 14832 58-38 23-17 35-21 P.L. 93-325 (June 30, 1974) 
      18-Feb-
75 H.R. 2634 70-20 24-10 46-10 P.L. 94-3 (February 19, 1975) 
 
26-Jun-
75 H.R. 8030 72-21 26-10 46-11 P.L. 94-47 (June 30, 1975) 
 
13-Nov-
75 H.R. 10585 VV VV VV P.L. 94-132 (November 14, 1975) 
      11-Mar-
76      
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H.R. 11893 VV VV VV P.L. 94-232 (March 15, 1976) 
30-Jun-
76 H.R. 14114 VV VV VV P.L. 94-334 (June 30, 1976) 
      30-Sep-
77 H.R. 9290 58-30 17-18 41-12 P.L. 95-120 (October 4, 1977) 
      22-Mar-
78 H.R. 11518 VV VV VV P.L. 95-252 (March 27, 1978) 
 
2-Aug-78 H.R. 13385 62-31 22-15 40-16 P.L. 95-333 (August 3, 1978) 
      27-Mar-
79 H.R. 2534 62-33 14-23 48-10 P.L. 96-5 (April 2, 1979) 
 
28-Sep-
79 H.R. 5369 49-29 15-19 34-10 P.L. 96-78 (September 29, 1979) 
      30-May-
80 H.R. 7471 47-10 21-7 26-3 P.L. 96-256 (May 30, 1980) 
 
6-Jun-80 H.R. 7428 68-10 33-0 35-10 P.L. 96-264 (June 6, 1980) 
 
26-Jun-
80 
H.J. Res 
569 54-39  8-30  46-9 P.L. 96-286(June 28, 1980) 
 
12-Dec-
80 
H.J. Res 
570 VV VV VV P.L. 96-556 (December 19, 1980) 
      6-Feb-81 H.R. 1553 73-18 46-3 27-15 P.L. 97-2  (February 7, 1981) 
 
29-Sep-
81 
H.J. Res 
266 VV VV VV P.L. 97-48 (September 30, 1981) 
 
29-Sep-
81 
H. J. Res 
265 64-34 46-6 18-28 P.L. 97-49  (September 30, 1981) 
      23-Jun-
82 
H.J. Res 
519 49-41 41-8 8-33  P.L. 97-204 (June 28, 1982) 
 
23-Sep-
82 
H.J. Res  
520 50-41 36-15 14-26 P.L. 97-270 (September 30, 1982) 
      25-May-
83 
H.J. Res 
2990 51-41 39-10 12-31 P.L. 98-34 (May 26, 1983) 
 
 
17-Nov-
83 
 
 
H. J. Res 
308 
 
 
VV 
 
 
VV 
 
 
VV 
 
 
P.L. 98-161 (November 21, 1983) 
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      24-May-
84 HR 5692 VV  VV VV P.L. 98-302 (May 25, 1984) 
 
28-Jun-
84 
 
HR 5953 
 
VV 
 
VV 
 
VV 
 
P.L. 98-342 (July 6, 1984) 
      12-Oct-
84 
H. J. Res 
654 37-30 37-4 0-26 P.L. 98-475 (October 13, 1984) 
      13-Nov-
85 H.R. 3721 VV  VV  VV  P.L. 99-155 (November 14, 1985) 
 
11-Dec-
85 
H.J. Res 
372 61-31 39-9 22-22 P.L. 99-177 (December 12 1985) 
      16-Aug-
86 
H.J. Res 
5395 36-35 26-9 10-26  P.L.  99-384 (August 21, 19860 
 
17-Oct-
86 H.R. 5300 61-25 33-10 28-15 P.L. 99-509 (October 21, 1986) 
      14-May-
87 H.R. 2360 58-36 25-18 33-18 P.L. 100-40 (May 15, 1987) 
 
29-Jul-87 H.R. 3022 VV VV VV P.L. 100-80 (July 30, 1987) 
 
7-Aug-87 H.R. 3190 51-39 18-25 33-14 P.L. 100-80 (July 30, 1987) 
 
22-Sep-
87 
H.J. Res 
324 64-34 33-13 31-21 
P.L. 100-119 (September 29, 
1987) 
      4-Aug-89 HR 3024 VV VV VV P.L. 101-72 (August 7, 1989) 
 
 
7-Nov-89 
H.J. Res 
280 VV VV VV P.L. 101-140 (July 7, 1989) 
      3-Aug-90 H.R. 5350 VV VV VV P.L. 101-350 (August 9, 1990) 
 
30-Sep-
90 H.R. 5755 UC UC UC P.L. 101-405 (October 2, 19900 
 
 
8-Oct-90 
H.J. Res 
666 VV VV VV P.L. 101-412 (October 9, 1990) 
 
 
 
19-Oct-
90 
 
 
 
H.J. Res 
677 
 
 
 
VV 
 
 
 
VV 
 
 
 
VV 
 
 
 
P.L. 101-444 (October 19, 1990) 
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24-Oct-
90 
 
H.J. Res 
681 
 
UC 
 
UC 
 
UC 
 
P.L. 101-461 (October 25, 1990) 
 
27-Oct-
90 
H.J. Res 
687 VV VV VV P.L. 101-467 (October 28, 1990) 
 
27-Oct-
90 H.R. 5835 54-45 19-25 35-20 P.L. 101-508 (November 5, 1990) 
      5-Apr-93 H.R. 1430 UC UC UC P.L. 103-12 (April 6, 1993) 
 
6-Aug-93 H.R. 2264 51-50 0-44 50-6 P.L. 103-66 (August 10, 1993) 
      1-Feb-96 H.R. 2924 UC UC UC P.L. 104-103 (February 8, 1996) 
 
3-Mar-96 H.R. 3021 VV VV VV P.L. 104-115  (March 12, 1996) 
 
28-Mar-
96 H.R. 3136 UC UC UC P.L. 104-121  (March 29, 1996) 
      31-Jul-97 H.R. 2015 85-15 42-12 42-3 P.L. 105-33 (August 5, 1997) 
      11-Jun-
02 S. 2578 68-29 31-15 36-14 P.L. 107-199 (June 28, 2002) 
      23-May-
03 H J Res 51 53-44 50-1 2-43 P.L. 108-24 (May 27, 2003) 
      17-Nov-
04 S. 2986 52-44 50-1 2-42 
P.L. 108-415 (November 11, 
2004) 
      16-Mar-
05 
H. J. Res 
47 52-48 51-3 1-44 P.L. 109-182 (March 20, 2006) 
      27-Sep-
07 
H. J. Res 
43 53-42 27-20 25-21 P.L. 110-91 (September 29, 2007) 
      26-Jul-08 H.R. 3221 72-13 27-13 43-0 P.L. 110-289  (July 30, 2009) 
 
1-Oct-08 H.R. 1424 74-25 34-15 39-9 P.L. 110-343 (October 3, 2008) 
      13-Feb-
09 H.R. 1 60-38 2-38 56-0 P.L. 111-5 (February 17, 2009) 
 
 
16-Dec-
09 
 
 
H.R. 4314 
 
 
60-39 
 
 
1-38 
 
 
57-1 
 
 
P.L. 111-123 (December 28, 
2009) 
D’Alessio 107 
 
      28-Jan-10 H.J. Res 45 60-39 0-39 58-0 P.L. 111-139 (February 12, 2010) 
      2-Aug-11 S. 365 74-26 28-19 46-7 P.L. 112-25 (August 2, 2011) 
       
VV= Voice Vote                    UC= Unanimous Consent 
 
Source: Source: CQ Almanac and Justin Murray, “Votes on Measures to Adjust the 
Statutory Debt Limit, 1978 to Present,” Congressional Research Service. (August 9, 
2011). 
 
 
